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PARKER, J., February 25, 189o. The recovery in this
action was for damages claimed to have been sustained be-
cause of a breach of an express warranty on the part of the
defendant to so construct a freezer for the plaintiff as that
chickens could be kept therein in perfect condition. The
jury have found the making of the warranty, its breach, and
the amount of damages resulting therefrom. The General
Term have affirmed these findings, and as there is some evi-
dence to support each proposition, we have but to consider
the exceptions taken. The appellant excepted to the charge
of the Court respecting the measure of damages. Upon the
trial he insisted, and still urges, that the proper measure of
damages is the cost of so changing the freezer as to obviate
the defect, and make it conform to the warranty. And Milk
Pan Co. v. Reminigon (1888), lO9 N. Y. 143, is- cited in
support of such contention. That decision was not intended
to, nor does it, modify the rule as recognized and enforced in
Passinger v. Thorburn (i866), 34 N. Y. 634 ; Wh7zite v. M4fil-
ler (1877), 71 Id. 133; ffakeman v. Wheeler & Wilson
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Manufacturing Co. (1886), Ioi Id. 205; Reed v. AMcConnelt
(1886), Id. 276, and kindred cases. In that case the ar-
gument of the Court demonstrates-First, that improper
evidence was received; and, second, that the finding of the
referee was without evidence to support it. No other propo-
sition was decided, and the discussion is not applicable ta
the facts before us.
The plaintiff was largely engaged in preparing poultry for
market, which he had either raised or purchased. Before
meeting the defendant, he had attempted to keep chickens
for the early spring market in a freezer or cooler which he
had constructed for the purpose. The attempt was unsuc-
cessful, and resulted in a loss. The jury have found, in ef-
fect, that the defendant, with knowledge of this intention of
the plaintiff to at once make use of it in the freezing and
preservation of chickens for the May market following, ex-
pressly represented and warranted that for about five hun-
dred dollars he would construct a freezer which should keep
them in perfect condition for such market; that he
failed to keep his contract in such respect, resulting in
a loss to the plaintiff of many hundred pounds of chick-
ens. The Court charged the jury that, if they should
find for the plaintiff, he was entitled to recover as
one of the elements of damage the difference between
the value of the refrigerator as constructed, and its.
value as it would have been if made according to
contract. The correctness of this instruction does not
admit of questioning. Had the defendant made no use of
the freezer, such rule would have embraced all the damages.
recoverable. But he did make use of it, and such use as was
contemplated by the contract of the parties. ,The result was
the total loss of hundreds of pounds of chickens. The fact
that the defendant well knew the use -to which the freezer
was to be immediately put, and his representation and
warranty that it would keep chickens in perfect condition,
burden him with the damage sustained because of his failure
to make good the warranty. Upon that question the Court
instructed the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to recover
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the value of the chickens, less cost of getting them to mar-
ket, including freight and fees of commission merchant.
The question of value was left to the jury, but they were
permitted to consider the evidence tending to show that
frozen chickens were worth forty cents a pound in the mar-
ket during the month of May. Such instruction we con-
sider authorized. The object of the freezer was to preserve
chickens for the May market. The expense of construction
and trouble, as well as expense of operation, was incurred
and undertaken in order to secure the enhanced prices of the
month of May. It was the extra profit which the plaintiff
was contracting to secure, and, in so far as the profits con-
templated by the parties can be proven, they may be con-
sidered. Gains prevented, as well as losses sustained, are
proper elements of damage: Wakeman v. THzeeler & Wilson
Mfanufaduring Co. (1886), IOI N. Y. 205.
We have carefully examined the other exceptions to the
charge as made, and to the refusals to charge as requested,
and also the exceptions taken to the admissibility of testi-
mony, but find no error justifying a reversal. The insistence
of the appellant that the judgment be reversed, because
against the weight of evidence, may have been entitled to
some consideration by the General Term, but it cannot be
regarded here.
The judgment should be affirmed. All concur, except
FoLLr'rT, C. J., and VANN, J., not sitting.
The underlying principle which
governs the measure of damages in
all cases is, that the person injured
shall receive a compensation com-
mensurate with his loss. In actions
ex contractu, the rule is, that such
damages are recoverable as the par-
ties contemplated would be likely to
result from a breach when the con-
tract was made. In actions ex
deliclo, the wrong doer is answer-
able for all the injurious conse-
qrences of his tortious act which,
according to the usual course of
events and the general experience
of mankind, were likely to ensue,
and which, therefore, he may rea-
sonably be supposed to have fore-
seen when the act was committed:
i Suth. Dam. ch. 3, 4.
In both kinds of action, the right
to recover for loss of anticipated
profits, is sometimes affirmed, and
sometimes denied, and the adjudi-
cations, on this subject, are far
fron harmonious. There is noth-
ing, however, in either of the above
rules, which necessarily excludes
BEIEMAN . BANTA.
ldss of profits as an element of
damage, though Mr. Parsons, in his
work on contracts, lays down the
general doctrine that: "Both in
England and America, it is gener-
ally held that profits are not to be
included in the injury for which
compensation is to be made, not
because they are in themselves re-
mote, but because they depend
wholly upon contingencies: " 3
Pars. Contract *181.
But in many of the cases, where
profits were excluded as an element
of damages, the ruling was based
upon the fact that the profits in
question were, in that particular
case, remote. It would seem to
follow that when loss of profits is
not a remote consequence of-the
cause of action, and' when the
profits can be ascertained with rea-
sonable certainty, and do not de-
pend wholly upon contingencies,
then they may be included in re-
coverable damages. And it is not
necessary that the amount of the
anticipated profits should be capable
of exact measurement, for where it
is certain that the loss of profits has
been caused by the defendant's act,
and the only uncertainty is, as to
their amount, such profits may
form the measure of damages:
Griffin v. Colz'er (857), i6 N. Y.
490; Wakeman v. Wheeler & Wil-
son Afg. Co. (1886), ioi N. Y. 205.
In actions for breach of a contract,
which had it been kept, would have
yielded the plaintiff a profit, the
loss of such profit, is the direct
consequence of the breach, and
such profit constitutes the measure
of damages.
It was this class of cases that Jus-
tice CURTIS referred to in The Phila-
delphia, W. andB. R. R. Co.v. How-
ard (185I), 13 How. (54 U. S,) 307,
where he says: "Wherever profits
are spoken of as not a subject of
damages, it will be found that
something contingent upon future
bargains or speculations, or states
of the market, are referred to, and
not the difference between the
agreed price of something con-
tracted for and its ascertainable
value or cost."
The leading case on this subject,
which is cited in nearly all the sub-
sequent decisions, is Nasterton v.
The Mayor (1845), 7 Hill (N.Y.) 61.
That was a case where a municipal'
corporation, which had contracted
to buy from plaintiff a certain
quantity of marble, to be quarried
and prepared by him, refused to
carry out its contract. The marble
in question, not being in* general
use, had no market value. It was
held, that the measure of damages
was the profit that the plaintiff
would have made out of the trans-
action, to be estimated by subtract-
ing the cost of quarrying and pre-
paring the marble from the price
which the city had contracted to
pay for it.
United States v. Speed (1868), 8
Wall. (75 U. S.) 77 was a case where
the War Department had entered
into a contract with Speed, to fur-
nish him with fifty thousand hogs
to be slaughtered for the govern-
ment at a stipulated price, and
only a small number of hogs were
furnished. The Supreme Court
held, that the profit Speed would
have made out of his contract, was
the measure of damages.
Upon breach, by the vendee, of
a contract to purchase logs at a
fixed price, the damages are the
profit that would have been made
by the vendor from fulfilling the
contract: Cunningham v. Dorsey
(1856), 6 Cal. i; that is, the differ-
ence between the cost of procuring,
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preparing and delivering the logs
and the contract price for them:
Cameron v. Hughes (1889), 74 Wis.
425.
Where a manufacturerhas agreed
to deliver certain goods, at a stipu-
lated price, and the vendee has
contracted to resell the same at an
advance, the measure of damages,
on failure to deliver, is the profit
the vendee would have made from
his resale: Van Arsdalk v. Run-
del (1876), 82 Ill 63.
In an action against a railroad
company, for refusal to allow the
plaintiff to do certain pile driving
for the company according to con-
tract, the damage allowed was the
difference between the costto plain-
tiff and the contract price of doing
the work: The Cincinnati, Indian-
afpolis, St. Louis and Chicago Ry.
Co. v. Lutes (1887), 112 Ind. 276.
In Boorman v. Nash (1829), 9 B.
and C. 145, the defendant had re-
fused to receive oil which he had
contracted to purchase, and the
Court fixed the plaintiff's damages
at the difference between the con-
tract and the market price of the
oil, in other words, the profit that
he would have made out of the
transaction.
In a case where a railroad com-
pany broke a contract whereby it
had agreed to store all the grain it
carried through a ccrtain place with
the plaintiff, the plaintiff could re-
cover as damages the profit he
would have made from storing
such grain: Richmondet aL v. The
Dubuque and Sioux City R. R. Co.
et al. (1871), 33 Iowa 422.
Where the tort or breach of con-
tract sued for, has caused an inter-
ruption of an established business,
the profits which would have been
made out of the business, had no
interruption occurred, constitute
the measure of damages. The loss
of profits is, in this class of cases,
the direct consequence of the de-
dendant's act, and since the busi-
ness is already established, the rate
of profit which has been made in
the past may fitly be taken as the
measure of damages which might
reasonably have been anticipated
for the future. But where the busi-
ness is not established, and the de-
fendant's act or omission merely
prevented the plaintiff from start-
ing it, the anticipated profits of
such proposed business have us-
ually though not invariably, been
excluded in the computation oi
damages.
Thus, in an action for breach of
a contract not to foreclose for a cer-
tain time a mortgage upon a farm
which the plaintiff used in his busi-
ness as a dairyman and which he
was so using when the contract was
made, evidence as to the value of
the use of the farm in plaintiff's
businesswasheldadmissible: Xian-
lvingv. Filch (1884), 138 Mass. 273;
and in an action by a partner
against his copartner for dissolving
the partnership before the time
agreed on, the plaintiff's share of
the anticipated profits during the
remainder of the term were allowed
as damages: Bagleyv. Smith (1853),
1o N. Y. 489.
Where the plaintiff is obliged, on
account of defendant's trespass, to
move away from a store in which
he has established a profitable busi-
ness, the falling off in his profits
after removal, form the measure of
damages: 4llison v. Chandler
(1863), II Mich. 542; Chapman v.
Kirby (z868), 49 Ill 211 ; Schile v.
b'rokhahus (i88o), 8oN. Y. 614.
But in a case in Illinois, a busi-
ness, that had only been running
for a month was not sufficiently
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established, to justify the applica-
tion of this rule: Illinois and St.
Louis R. R. and Coal Co. v. Decker
(1878), 3 Brad. (Ill.) 135. Suchloss
of profits is also the measure of
damages, where the plaintiff's busi-
ness has been interfered with by
the wrongful refusal of the de-
defendant to furnish him with gas:
Shepard v. Milwaukee Gas Light
Co. (1862), 15 Wis. 318; or steam
power: Chapman v. Kirby (1868),
49 Il1. 211 ; or water: Holden v.
Lake Co. (1873), 53 N. H. 552; or
to make repairs according to con-
tract: Stewart v. Lanier House
Co. (I885), 75 Ga. 582.
In an action by the owner of a
saw mill for failure to deliver logs,
the lack of which caused the mill
to be idle, profits that would have
been earned had the mill run are
recoverable: Leonard v. Beaudry
(1888), 68 Mich. 3 12 ; but wherethe
mill did not stop, the profits antici-
pated from sawing the logs which
were not delivered, are not recover-
able: Petrie v. Lane (1887), 67
Mich. 454. Where the owners of a
rolling mill contracted for the pur-
chase of a certain amount of iron,
of a quality not procurable else-
where, and the vendor failed to de-
liver according to contract, it was
held, that the measure of damages
was the loss the vendees sustained,
in their business, by being obliged
to use an inferior quality of iron in
their manufactures: AfcHosev. Ful-
mer (1873), 73 Pa. 365.
Where the lessor of premises in-
tended to be used for business pur-
poses, refuses to yield possession,
the American authorities hold that
the expected profits of the business
are not recoverable: Giles v.
O'Toole (1848), 4 Barb. (N. Y.) 261 ;
Green v. Williams (1867), 45 Ill.
2o6; Kenz.y v. Collier (1887), 79
Ga. 743 ; though the contrary doc-
trine has been announced in Eng-
land ; Jacques v. Millar (1877), L.
R., 6 Ch. Div. 153 ; but where the
premises are leased for the purpose
of carrying on a business which the
lessee has already established in
another store in the vicinity which
he has given up in reliance on his
lease, profits lost from the lessor's
refusal to yield possession are re-
coverable : Poposkey v. Mfunkwitz
(1887), 68 Wis, 322.
Whether profits anticipated from
the enjoyment of a leased farm are
recoverable in an action against the
landlord for refusing to yield pos-
session is a disputed question. The
right to recover such profits is af-
firmed in Taylor v. Bradley (1868),
39 N. Y. 129; and Wolf v. Stude-
baker (1870), 65 Pa. 459; and de-
nied in Rhodes v. Baird (I866), x6
Ohio St., 573 ; Cilley v. Hawkins
(1868), 48 Ill. 3o8; and Robrecht
v. Marling (1887), 29 W. Va. 765.
Anticipated profits are not re-
coverable in America in an action
for breach of contract in not com-
pleting machinery in time; Mc-
Boyle v. Reeder (1841), 22 N. C.
607; Freeman v. Clute (1848), 3
Barb. (N. Y.) 424; Benton v. Fay
(1872), 64 11. 417; or a vessel,
Taylor v. Afaguire (1848), 12 Mo.
313; or a railroad, Hunt v. Oregon
Pac. Ry. Co. (1888), U. S. C. Ct.,
D. Ore., 36 Fed. Repr. 481 ; though
the English case of Fletdher v.
Tayleur (1856), 17 C.B. 21 is op-
posed to this doctrine, and in a
very recent case in Massachusetts,
it was held that in an action by a
vendee for breach of contract for
the sale of goods which were pur-
chased for the purpose of starting
a business, loss of profits of the
business was a proper element of
damages. Abbott and others v.
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.tiapgood and another (1889), 15o
Mass. 248.
In an action against the master
of a whaling ship, for breaking up
a voyage, the anticipated profits of
the voyage are not recoverable:
Brown v. Smith (1853), 12 Cush.
(Mass.) 366.
A carrier, who by delay in trans-
porting goods, causes a loss of
profit to the owner, is not respon-
sible therefor if he had no notice
of the special reasons making de-
lays dangerous: Hadley v. Baxen-
dale (1854), 26 Eng. L. and Eq. 398;
but if he had such notice, he is re-
sponsible for the loss of profit, as
where he knew that the goods had
been advantageously sold on con-
dition of their reaching their desti-
fiation atacertain time: St. Louis,
1. M. and S. Ry. Co. v. Mfudford
(i886), 48 Ark. 5o2. Wherea man-
ulfacturer delivered his goods to a
railroad company to be carried to
a place where an agricultural show
was to be held at which he intended
to exhibit them, and the goods ar-
rived too late for the show, it was
held that loss of profit from the
exhibition was to be considered in
estimating damages: Simpson v.
The London and Northwestern
Railway Co. (1876), L. R. i. Q. B.
Div. 274. But where a railroad
company negligently delayed de-
livery of cloth intended to be made
into caps, until the end of the sea-
son, it was not liable for the loss of
profits that might have been made
on the caps: Wilson v. The Lan-
cashire and Yorkshire Ry. Co.
(I86I), 9 C. B. (N. S.) 632.
Where negligent delay in deliv-
ering or failure to deliver a tele-
gram, causes loss of profits to the
sender, he may recover the amount
of such profits from the telegraph
company. Thus where a message,
directing the purchase of stocks
or grain, is not delivered until
the prices have risen, compelling
the sender to pay more for his.
stock than he need have done, had.
there been no delay, he may re-
cover for his loss of a profitable,
bargain: The United States Tele-
graph Co. v. Wenger (1867), 55 Pa.
262 ; Rittenhouse and others v. The
Independent Line of Telegraph
(1870), 44 N. Y. 263; True and
another v. International Telegraph
Co. (1872),6o Me. 9. Andthesame
rule has been applied where the
telegram was an acceptance of goods
at a certain figure, and the sender
w~s afterwards obliged to pay more
for them: Squire and others v.
Western Union Telegraph Co-
(1867), 97 Mass. 232; and where
it was a direction to buy land,
which, in consequence of the delay,
was sold toanother person, and af-
terwards rose in value: Alexander
et al. v. Western Union Telegraph
Co. (I888), 66 Miss. 161 ; and where
such telegram was an order to sell
goods, which afterwards fell in
value: Daugherty v. Americart
Union Telegraph Co. (x883) 75
Ala. 168; Thompson and another
v. The Western Unzon Telegraph
Co. (1885), 64 Wis. 531. Butatele-
graph company is not liable forgains
expected to be realized from trotting
a race horse at a fair: The Vestern
Union Telegraph Co. v. Crall
(1888), 30 Kan. 58o. And where
the delay, in delivering the mes-
sage, merely causes the party not
to buy certain property of a fluc-
tuating value, on which he might,
or might not, have made a profit,
according to the time when he
should have sold it, and he does
not in fact buy it at all, the antici-
pated profits of the transaction are
too contingent to be recovered:
IIr
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Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Hall (1888), 124U. S. 444; Cannon
and others, trading as Cannon,
Fetzer & Wadsworth, v. Western
Union Telegraph Co. (i888), xoo
N. C. 3oo. Where delay in deliv-
ering a telegram caused an under-
taker to lose an order, the Court re-
fused to allow him his anticipated
profit thereon: Clay v. The West-
ern Union Telegraph Co. (1888), 81
Ga. 285; though in cases almost
similar, the recovery of such profit
was allowed to a broker: The
Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Falman (1884), 73 Ga. 285 ; and to
a doctor: Western Union Tele.
graph Co. v. Longwill, decided in
the Supreme Court of New Mexico
March 21, 1889.
In actions for the wrongful dis-
charge of the plaintifffrom an occu-
pation in which his compensation
was measured by the profits of the
business, the authorities are con-
flicting. Thus the master of a
whaling ship who was to have a
certain share in the proceeds of the
voyage, and an additional compen-
sation depending upon the amount
of the cargo, may recover his share
of the profits both before and after
his wroiigful discharge: Dennis v.
Maxfield (1865), io Allen (Mass.)
x38 ; and in an action for breach of
a contract to employ the plaintiff
to work a farm on shares, the meas-
ure of damages was the profit the
plaintiff would have made had the
contract been fulfilled: Hoy v,.
Gronoble (1859), 34 Pa. 9; and
where manufacturer of sewing
machines agreed that if an agent
would sell a certain number of
their machines to any one firm, he
should have the sole agency for
their machines at that place, the
agent was entitled, on breach of
such agreement, to recover the
probable profits of such sole agency;
Wakeman v. Wheeler & Wilson
Mfg. Co. (r886), Iox N. Y. 205. But
in two cases, where the facts were
almost identical with those in
Wakeman v. Wheeler and Wilson
M1fg. Co., supra, the recovery of
probable profits was not allowed:
Howe Mach. Co. v. Bryson (1876),
44 Iowa i59; Taylor Mfg. Co. v.
Hatcher Mfg. Co. (1889), U. S. C.
Ct., S. D., Ga. 39 Fed. Repr. 44o.
And the anticipated profits of a
salesman, whdsells on commission,
are too uncertain to be recovered:
Union Refining Co. v. Barton
(1884), 77 Ala. 148 ; Stern v. Rosen-
heim (1887), 67 Md. 503, exceptas to
future sales-for which he had made
definite contracts: Beck v. West
(1888), 87 Ala. 213.
Where a life insurance agent, who
received as compensation a share of
the premiums on policies secured
by him, was wrongfully discharged,
it was held-that while an estimate
of his probable future earnings, as
computed from the number of poli-
cies theretofore obtained by him,
was too uncertain to be considered
in estimating damages, yet that his
loss of profits was the measure of
damages, and the probable value of
the renewals of the policies he had
obtained, being ascertainable by
calculation, was competent proof
of such loss: Lewis v. Ins. Co.
(1876), 61 Mo. 534.
On breach of warranty that seed
sold was of a particular kind, the
damages aliowed were the differ-
ence in value between the crop
raised from the seed sold and the
crop that could have been raised
from the seed if it had been as war-
ranted: Passinger v. Thorburn
(1866), 34 N. Y. 634; Wolott v.
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Mount (1873), 36 N.J. Law 262; the doctrine laid down in the prin-
While v. Miller (1877), 71 N. Y. cipal case, yet the decisions on the
II8. subject are by no means har-
It will thus be seen that while a monious. LouIs BOISOT, JR.
majority of the authorities sustain Chicago, Ill.
LThe question of the right to recover profits as and by way of damages,
has also arisen in the case of a real estate broker engaged to procure a
purchaser, where his commission was to be such sum as he could procure
over and above a stated sum, fixed by the owner as the price of the prop-
erty, and the vendor has, before the time stipulated by the agreement,
sold the property himself. Thus in Fairchildv. Rogers (1884), 32 Minn.
269, an action for damages for breach of contract, the defendant, for
a valuable consideration, had agreed with the plaintiff that the latter
should have the exclusive right, for sixty days, to sell real estate belonging
to the defendant, the plaintiff to retain all he received over a given sum.
The breach alleged was a sale by the defendant within the time, the
amount claimed being the excess over the sum named as the price to be
accepted. The contract was a verbal one, and the Court below found for
the defendant. The Court, in ordering a new trial, said: "The recovery
sought can only be opposed upon the ground that the fact of a loss of pro-
fit, and the amount of it, were not proved; that it did not appear that the
plaintiff would have sold the land if his authority had not been termina-
ted by the defendant, nor for how much he would have sold it. * * *
The general rule that the loss of profits affords no basis for the awarding
of damages for breach of contract, in cases where the profits were to have
accrued from some engagement or contract independent of and collateral
to the principal contract, for the breach of which the action is brought;
that is to say, in cases where the contemplated profits do not arise natur-
ally,-that is, in the usual course of things,-from the breach itself; or
are not such as may reasonably be supposed to have been contemplated by
the parties, when making the contract, as the probable result of the
breach. But the reason which governs such cases has no application in a
case like that under consideration, where the anticipated profit was to
have been realized directly from the contract which these parties are al-
leged to have made. By the very terms of the contract, the plaintiff, by
the performance of it, was to realize the very profit which he claims to
have lost by the breach complained of, and for which he now seeks to
recover damages. There is no legal reason for denying the right to re-
cover such profits as the parties contemplated as the direct result of the
contract. But one seeking a recovery must show by proof both his right
to recover, and the measure or extent of the loss or injury for which he
demands compensation. * * * It is not necessary, however, that the
evidence should show this to an absolute certainty. Proof establishing
the facts, in the estimation of the jury, to a reasonable degree of certainty,
would be sufficient. * * In this case the result depended upon facts
which were not susceptible of certain, absolute proof; such as the profit
which might have accrued from an established mercantile business."
VoL. XXX-8 R. W.
SThNSGAARD V. SMITH.
Sureme Court of Mfinnesola.
STENSGAARD v. SMITH.
In a contract between a real estate broker and his principal there must
be mutuality; therefore, where the contract is unilateral, or merely
amounts to an authority to sell, without imposing any obligation upon
the broker, he must show a sale in pursuance of such authority, before he
can recover his commissions, or other compensation.
So long as such an instrument remains a mere present authorization to
sell, without contract obligations having been fixed, it is revocable by the
:rincipal.
This was an action for damages for a breach of contract,
-begun in the District Court of Ramsey County, Minnesota,
August 25, 1887, and tried before the Hon. WILLIAM imwis
KILY, March 13 and 14, 1889. At the close of the plain-
tiff's testimony, upon the defendant's motion, the Court in-
structed the jury as follows:
This action is based upon the following written instrument:
ST. PAU1, MwN., Dec. ii, x86.
In consideration of L. T. Stensgaard agreeing to act as agent for the
sale of the property hereinafter mentioned, I have hereby given to said I,.
T. Stensgaard, the exclusive sale, for three months, of the following de-
scribed property, to wit: Lots 3 and 4, block 49, Addition, Kittson's Ad-
dition to St. Paul. Size, SoxIoo each; price, $17,000; incumbrance,
none, terms, $5,ooo cash, balance three and five years, interest 7 per cent.
-per annum payable annually. Improvements. And for which I author-
ize him to execute and deliver a contract for a warranty, which I agree to
furnish as per this contract, and also to furnish an abstract to purchaser
without delay. I further agree to pay said L. T. Stensgaard, a commis-
sion of 2y per cent. on the first two thousand dollars, and 2a3 per cent.
-on the balance of the purchase price, for his services rendered in sale of
above mentioned, whether the title is accepted or not,and also whatever
he may get or obtain for said property over $17,oo, when said prop-
erty is sold.
Witness my hand, tjie day and year above mentioned.
JOHN SMITH.
JAMES G. NEi.SoN.
It appears in evidence that this paper was signed and delivered by the
,defendant to the plaintiff about the day of its date, and that the plaintiff
thereafter took certain steps, by advertisingthe property, to effect a sale
of it. It appears also that he did not effect any sale of it, but that about
the twelfth of January, 1887, the defendant, John Smith, himself sold the
CHARGE OF THE COURT BELOW.
property and conveyed it to a third party, thus terminating the agency as
far as his connection in the matter.
Now, the defendant moves upon this evidence, for an instruction from
the Court, for judgment upon the ground that the evidence shows that
the plaintiff is not entitled to recover.
It is argued here that this is a contract of hiring, and a number of cases
have been cited to the Court which undoubtedly contain good law, that
-where there has been a contract of hiring, and where the servant enters
u.pon his duty, or stands willing and ready to enter upon his duty, and
is prevented by the act of the master, that although the contract may in a
-certain sense be said to be unilateral, that the servant can recover for the
reasonable value of his services.
I do not think this is a contract of hiring. I think, if it is anything, it
is a contract upon the part of Stensgaard, if it is a contract at all upon his
-part, it would be a contract upon his part to sell that property, and a con-
tract upon the part of the other party to pay Stensgaard for his services in
selling the property a certain commission and all that might be obtained
for it above $17,000. Now, it appears the Mr. Stensgaard did not sell the
property. It is true that he claims that he did not sell it, because the de-
fendant sold it before him. The contract upon its face is unilateral; it
is not mutual. The facts in this case, I am satisfied, do not warrant a
recovery.
In the case of Fairchild v. Rogers (1884), 32 Minn. 269, which is relied
upon here as authority, the agent who was permitted to recover there for
a sale which he could have made but for the action of his principal, had
-paid $200 for the privilege of having the exclusive sale of that property
during a specified time; it was a valuable consideration. The plaintiff in
this case was obligated to do nothing. He colild shut up his real estate
office, if he chose, the day after this contract was made, and keep it shut
until it expired, and there would be no remedy whatever for the defend-
ant; he could not recover upon it.
Now, as I have said, I do not think it is a contract of hiring, and there-
fore I distinguish the case from the case of Horn v. The Land Company
(1875), 22 Minn. 233, and other cases that have been cited. I think the
case comes squarely within the doctrine laid down in Bailey v. Austrian
pi87 3 ), I9 Minn. 465; Tarbox v. Golzian (1873), 20 Id. 139, and Andreas
-v. Holcomb (1876), 22 Id. 339- In the case of Andreas v. Holcomb, the
ease was almost verbatim like the one at bar, but which the Supreme
Court held was not binding at all upon the Andreas Atlas Company, but
that they, having performed it fully, the plaintiff had a right to recover.
If this was a case where, 1efore the revocation of the contract by Smith.
the plaintiff had shown that he had effected a sale of the property, then
there would have been no doubt about the plaintiff's right to recover.
Upon the evidence in this case, and the law, as I understand it,. I in-
struct you, gentlemen, the defendant is entitled to a verdict.
The verdict being rendered for the defendant, and the
Court refusing to grant a new trial, the plaintiff appealed.
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0. H. Hubbard and John W. Willis [who kindly fur-
nished us with the record and briefs] for appellant.
Kueffner and Fauntleroy for respondent.
DICKINSON, J., February 17, 189o. This action is for the
recovery of damages for breach of contract. The rulings of
the Court below, upon the trial, were based upon its conclu-
sion that no contract was shown to have been entered into
between these parties. We are called upon to review the
case upon this point. The plaintiff was engaged in business
as a real estate broker. On the eleventh of December, 1886,
he procured the defendant to execute the following instru-
ment, which was mostly in printed form. [Here follows a
copy of the contract as above set forth.]
The evidence showed that the plaintiff immediately took
steps to effect a sale of the land, posted notices upon it, pub-
lished advertisements in newspapers, and individually solic-
ited purchasers. About a month subsequent to the execu-
tion by the defendant of the above instrument, he himself
sold the property. This constitutes the alleged breach of
contract for which a recovery of damages is sought.
The Court was justified in its conclusion that no contract
was shown to have been entered into, and hence that no
cause of action was established. The writing signed by the
defendant did not of itself constitute a contract between
these parties. In terms indicating that the instrument was
intended to be at once operative, it conferred present author-
ity on the plaintiff to sell the land, and included the
promise of the defendant that, if the plaintiff should
sell the land he should receive the stated compensa-
tion. This alone was no contract, for there was no
mutuality of oblgation, nor any other consideration for
the agreement of the defendant The plaintiff did not
by this instrument obligate himself to do anything, and
therefore the other party was not bound: Baiy v. Aus-
trian (1873), 19 Minn. 535; Tarbox v. Golzian (1873), 2o
Id. i39. If, acting under the authority thus conferred, the
plaintiff had, before its revocation, sold the land, such per-
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formance would have completed a contract, and the plaintiff
would have earned the compensation promised by the de-
fendant for such performance: Andreas v. Holcomb (1876),
22 Minn. 339; Ellsworth v. Southern Afhznesota Railway
Extensimn Co. (1884), 31 Id. 543. But so long as this re-
mained a mere present authorization to sell, without con-
tract obligations having been fixed, it was revocable by the
defendant.
The instrument, does, it is true, commence with the
words: "In consideration of L. T. Stensgaard agreeing to
act as agent for the sale of the property," &c.; but no such
agreement on the part of the plaintiff was shown on the
trial to have been actually made, although it was incumbent
upon him to establish the existence of a contract as the basis
of his action. This instrument does not contain an agree-
ment on the part of the plaintiff, for he is no party to its
execution. It expresses no promise or agreement except
that of the defendant. It may be added that the language of
the "consideration" clause is not such as naturally expresses
the fact of an agreement having been already made on the
part of the plaintiff. Of course, no consideration was neces-
sary to support the present, but revocable, authorization to
sell. It is difficult to give any practical effect to this clause,
in the construction of the instrument. It *seems probable,
in the absence of proof of such an agreement, that this clause
had no reference to any actual agreement between those
parties, but was a part of the printed matter which the
plaintiff had prepared for use in his business, with the inten-
tion of making it effectual by his own signature. If he had
appended to this instrument his agreement to accept the
agency, or even if he had signed this instrument, this clause
would have had an obvious meaning.
This instrument, executed only by the defendant, was ef-
fectual, as we have said, as a present, but revocable, grant of
authority to sell. It involved, moreover, an offer on the
part of the defendant to contract with the plaintiff that the
latter should have, for the period of three months, the exclu-
sive right to sell the land. This action is based upon the
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theory that such a contract was entered into; but, to consti-
tute such a contract, it was necessary that the plaintiff should
in some way signify his acceptance of the offer, so as to
place himself under the reciprocal obligation to exert him-
self during the whole period named to effect a sale. No ex-
press agreement was shown. The mere receiving and 're-
taining this instrument did not import an agreement thus
to act for the period named, for the reason that, whether the
plaintiff should be willing to take upon him that obligation
or not, he might accept and act upon the revocable author-
ity to sell expressed in the writing; and, if he should succeed
in effecting a sale before the power should be revoked, he
would earn the commission specified. In other words, the
instrument was presently effectual, and of advantage to him,
whether he chose to place himself under contract obliga-
tions or not. For the same reason the fact that for a day or
a month he availed himself of the right to sell conferred by
the defendant, by attempting to make a sale, does not justify
the inference, in an action where the burden is on the plain-
tiff to prove a contract, that he had accepted the offer of the
defendant to conclude a contract covering the period of three
months, so that he could not have discontinued his efforts
without rendering himself liable in damages. In brief, it
was in the power of the plaintiff either to convert the de-
fendant's offer and authorization into a complete contract, or
to act upon it as a naked revocable power, or to do nothing
at all. He appears to have simply availed himself for about
a mouth of the naked present right to sell, if he could do so.
He cannot now complain that the landowner then revoked
the authority, which was still unexecuted.
It may be added that there was no attempt at the trial to
show that the plaintiff notified the defendant that he was en-
deavoring to sell the land; and there is but little, if any,
ground for an inference from the evidence that the defendant
in fact knew it. The case is distinguishable from those
where, under a unilateral promise, there has been a perform-
ance by the other party of services, or other thing to be
done, for which, by the terms of the promise, compensation
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was to be made. Such was the case of Goward v. Waters
(1868), 98 Mass. 596, relied upon by the appellant as being
strictly analogous to this case. In the case before us, com-
pensation was to be paid only in case of a sale of the land by.
the plaintiff. He can recover nothing for what he did, un-
less there was a complete contract; in which case, of course,
he might have recovered damages for its breach. Order
affirmed.
There has been much litigation
upon the right of a real estate
broker to receive payment of his
commissions, the principal case
being one of many that have re-
cently occupied the attention of
the courts.
The peculiarity of the contract
therein entered into between the
landowner and the broker suggests,
'perhaps more than any of the other
cases, for consideration, the ques-
tion: When, and under what cir-
cumstances, is a real estate broker
entitled to receive his commissions
from his employer? This question
is thus answered by Story in his
-work on Agency: " 329. The
general rule of law, as to commis-
sions undoubtedly is, that the whole
service or duty must be performed,
before the right to any commis-
sions attaches, either ordinary or
extraordinary; for an agent must
complete the thing required of
him, before he is entitled to charge
for it."
From this answer and general
statement of the law, the question
naturally presents itself: When may
the thing required of him boe said
to be completed? Or, in other
words, When, and at what time,
lhas he performed his part of the
contract? Must the transaction in
which he is interested, be fully
completed and ended in all re-
spects, before he is entitled to be
paid, or is the mere fact of his hav-
ing found or introduced a pur-
chaser, having brought the parties
together, without further action or
interference on his part, sufficient?
The real answer to these ques-
tions must lie in the engagement
entered into in each particular case,
for the agent must comply with
the terms of the original contract.
This is shown by the recent case of
Shuliz v. Grflin (189o), 12 N. Y.
294, where Shultz was employed
by Griffin to make sale and dispose
of a farm for a specified price, to
be paid in the manner indicated in
the written agreement signed by
Griffin, for which sale Shultz was
to receive a certain commission,
and to have the exclusive sale for
twenty days. Within the time
specified, Shultz procured a person
to sign a contract as purchaser.
The contract, however, varied in
its terms of payment from the
terms mentioned in the original
contract between Shultz and Grif-
fin, and, consequently, Griffin re-
fused it, and sold the property to
another. In reversing the plain-
tiff's judgment, Justice ANDaws
said: "The burden was upon the
plaintiff to show that the contract
with Longnecker [the purchaser]
was such a one as was authorized
by the agreement with Griffin."
The same principle is declared
in Blumenthall v. Goodail, de-
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cided in the Supreme Court of
California, December 6, I89o, where
the contract was to be in force for
ten days from its date, and was
duly dated and signed. On the
day of the date of the contract,
the agent procured a party willing
to purchase upon certain terms,
among them a stipulation that he
should be allowed thirty days to
examine the abstract. This was
objected to by the vendor, and, on
the purchaser saying he would ex-
amine it earlier, if possible, he re-
ceived and receipted for the ab-
stract, but no time for its return
was mentioned. Later in the same
day, the owner received a letter
from another party stating that he
had purchased from the agent, and
thereupon the owner gave written
notice to the first purchaser and the
agent revoking the authority to
sell, and alleging that it had been
procured through misrepresenta-
tion. In affirming defendant's judg-
ment, Justice Fox said: "Goodall
had the right to revoke the a~ithor-
ity given * * at any time before
complete performance. * * Up
to the time of the revocation in
this case, there had been no per-
formance on the part of [the agent].
Performance on his part, to entitle
him to his commissions, would
have been the production of a pur-
chaser, then ready and willing to
make the purchase upon the terms
embraced in the authority. No
such purchaser had been found
and produced when the authority
was revoked. Neither of those who
are claimed to have been such, had
up to that time signified their wil-
lingness to take the property un-
conditionally upon the terms pro-
posed." From this judgment, how-
ever, Justices WORKS and THORN-
TON dissented.
In McPhail v. Buell, decided also
in the Supreme Court of California,
December 15, 189o, the agreement
was that the defendant would pay
the plaintiff, when the vendees paid
to him (the defendant) a sum on
account, and executed to him their
notes and a mortgage for the bal-
ance. The notes and mortgage
were executed, but the money on
account was not paid, although the
time was extended, and the defend-
ant was finally compelled to take
back the property. Here Justice
WORKS held that "Their [the pur-
chasers'] failure to pay the money
was a complete bar to any claim of
the appellant to commissions," and
affirmed the defendant's judgment
To the same effect, Thomas et al. v.
Lincoln (i88o), 71 Ind. 4I; Hoyt v.
Shepherd el al. (1873), 70 Ill- 309;
Harwood el al. v. Tyriplell (1889),
34 Mo. App. 273.
The same rule applies in the case
of a broker employed to effect an
exchange of property; the minds
of the parties must meet. Thus in
Rockwell v. Newton (1877), 44
Conn. 333, where the action was to
recover brokerage upon a contract
made between the parties, whereby
the defendant agreed to give the
plaintiff a certain sum if he would
procure an exchange of land upon
satisfactory terms. The plaintiff
introduced one Smith to the de-
fendant; terms were arranged be-
tween the parties, the plaintiff was
instructed to prepare the deeds and
necessary papers (which he did),
and Smith was ready to fulfill his
part, but the defendant refused to
perform his, and that, without as-
signing any reason. The Court
below found for the plaintiff, but
its judgment was reversed on ap-
peal, Justice PARDEE saying: "In-
asmuch as no exchange was in fact
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effected for the reason that the
minds of the partiesfiid not meet
upon any common point, we think
that the plaintiff has never per-
formed the condition precedent
upon which his right to recover
brokerage rests."
Not only must the agent or broker
comply with the terms of the orig-
inal contract by bringing the
parties together, where his con-
tract is to procure a purchaser, but
he must show that such person is a
purchaser, not a party who has a
mere offer to make. He must pro-
duce a person who is able, ready
.nd willing to complete the con-
tract in every respect, according to
its terms and conditions, and prove
that it was through his efforts, upon
his introduction, that the sale was
effected, or in other words, he must
show that he was the causa causans
for such sale.
This principle is supported by
the Supreme Court of the United
States in Mc~avock v. Woodlief
(1858), 20 How. (61 U. S.) 69, here-
inafter more fully cited upon
another point, where the Court ex-
pressed the rule thus: "The broker
must complete the sale; he must
find a purchaser in a situation, and
ready and willing to complete the
purchase on the terms agreed on,
before he is entitled to his commis-
sions." The same doctrine is held
in Birmingham Land and Loan
Co. v. Thompsoa (x888), 86 Ala.
146, by Chief Justice STo in
these words: "The office of a real
estate broker, who is employed to
negotiate sales of property, is that
he should find a purchaser able and
willing tdbuy; and that he should
be the efficient cause of bringing
the minds of the proposed pur-
chaser and would-be vendor to-
gether. When this is done, the
office of the real estate broker has
been performed, and he has earned
his commission. * * He has
fully performed his part of the
transaction, when he has secured a
purchaser, able and willing to buy.
His office has ceased, and his com-
mission is earned."
In Keys v.Johnson (1871), 68 Pa.
42, Justice SHARSWOOD thus states
the law: "Brokers are persons
whose business it is to bring buyer
and seller together. -Thfey- need
have nothing to do with the nego-
tiation of the bargain. A broker
becomes entitled to his commis-
sions whenever he procures for his
principal a party with whom he is
satisfied, and who actually con-
tracts for the purchase of the prop-
erty at a price acceptable to the
owner. He must establish his em-
ployment as broker, either, by pre-
vious authority, or by the accept-
ance of his agency and the adop-
tion of his acts, and also must
prove that his agency was the pro-
curing cause of the sale."
The same principle is held in
Illinois, where Short v. Millard
(1873), 68 Ill. 292, was an action to-
recover for services as agent, result-
ing in a judgment for the plaintiff.
The defendant had agreed that if
the plaintiff would find a purchaser
for a piece of land, he would pay
him a given sum. The plaintiff
procured a purchaser, and the sale
was consummated. It was alleged
in defense, that the plaintiff acted
as agent for both parties without
notice to the defendant. It was
proved, however, that this was not
so until after the sale was dosed.
In affirming the judgment the
Court said: "There is no doubt
that appellee was the agent of ap-
pellant in procuring a purchaser,
* * when he had fully performed
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the agency, and it was at an end,
he then received a retainer from
the purchaser to see that the papers
were properly prepared and exe-
cuted. In this we perceive nothing
wrong or inconsistent. * * *
When he found the purchaser he
was no longer the agent of appel-
lant, and was free."
In Bash et al. v. Hill et al. (1871),
62 Ill. 216, the Court below in-
structed the jury that if they found
upon the evidence that the defend-
ants agreed with the plaintiffs that
if the plaintiffs would assist them
in making a trade in ieal estate,
the defendants would pay plaintiffs
d certain sum; and if the jury
further found that the plaintiffs,
relying upon such agreement, did
assist, and such trade was in fact
made, plaintiffs were entitled to re-
cover. On appeal, justice WALK R
in affirming the judgment, said:
"W6 perceive no error in the in-
struction given by the Court. * *
It states the law of the case cor-
rectly, and could not have misled
the jury." The defendants in this
case sought to free themselves from
responsibility upon the ground
(inter alia) that a change in the
terms of sale had occurred. On
this point the Court held that,
"Appellants [the defendants], hav-
ing engaged thd services of ap-
pellees, should, if they desired to
dispense with their services, have
given them notice. On the con-
trary, they seem to haye omitted
to do so, thus availing themselves
of their services, and when a trade
is made they refuse to compensate
them."
In Davis v. Gassette (1889), 3o
Ill. App. 41, the plaintiff solicited
from the defendant the sale of
property. -The defendant con-
seated, and the plaintiff finally
brought one Partridge to look- at
the property, but no sale was
effected, and the property was not
afterwards called to Partridge's at-
tention by the plaintiff. Subse-
quently another broker commenced
negotiations between the defendant
and Partridge, for an exchange of
their respective properties, and a
contract was made. The plaintiff
claimed his commission, on the
ground that the defendant gave
him the exclusive agency for the
sale of -the property, and that he
first offered the property to Part-
ridge. In giving judgment for the
defendant, Justice MoR said:
"It is, in our opinion, very clear
* * that appellee [plaintiff] did
not earn commissions by the per-.
formance of his contract. His
agency was to sell the property at
a specified sum. It would be ab-"
surd to say that he could earn his.
commission by bringing to his prin-
cipal a customer with a mere offer
to trade for the property. * * *
The fact that -appellee [plaintiffl
first called Partridge's attention to.
the property cannot be held, as it
seems to us, to have contributed
proximately to the subsequent trade
between the parties. All the at-
tempts on the part of appellee
[plaintiff] to induce Partridge to
purchase the property had ceased.
* * The fact that a sale or ex-
change of the property is finally
brought about by the efforts of the
principal or another broker with
a person with whom the first broker
had previously negotiated without
success, will not furnish a legal
basis for a claim for commissions
by the first broker, especially when
it appears that the first broker has
for a long time ceased negotiations7
with the purchaser, and abandoned-
all efforts to induce him to take-
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the property on the proposed terms.
* * In order to be entitled to
commissions, it is indispensable
that the broker should show that
he has produced a purchaser, ready
anc willing to take the property on
the terms specified, or that his
efforts were the procuring cause of
the sale which the principal has
made to the purchaser with -whom
he has been. brought into commu-
nication."
In Van Gorder v. Sherman, de-
, cided in the Supreme Court of
Iowa, October 25, i89o, the plain-
tiff was tor have one year to find a
purchaser for defendant's property
for a certain price in cash, and was
to receive all he got above that sum
as and by way of commission. He
procured a purchaser for a larger
amount, who was to pay the given
price in cash, and the balance to
the laintiff on time. The defend-
ant sold the land to another. The
Court found that the plaintiff had
found a purchaser able, ready and
Willing to purchase and pay for the
land, and therefore affirmed the
judgment for his commissions. The
case of Dent v. Powell et al., de-
cided in the Supreme Court of
Iowa, June 3, 189o, also shows that
the purchaser must be a person
able, ready and willing to take the
property upon the terms agreed.
The case of Pearson v. Mason
(I876), 120 Mass. 53, was an action
in contract,z the plaintiff, alleging
that-he sold to the defendant ceitain
land -and shares, and received in
payment certain other shares; that
the defendant at the time, in con-
sideration of the sale, agreed to
buy other shares, and upon request
pay for them; that plaintiff *had
offered to sell and assign the shares,
and had demanded payment, but
defendant refused and neglected to
pay. It was further alleged that
the defendant agreed, that if the
plaintiff would introduce the de-
fendant to anyone who would trade
with him for certain other property,
defendant would pay plaintiff a
certain other sum; that plaintiff,
did introduce a party who traded
with him therefor. At the trial in
the Court below, the defendant re-
quested the judge to instruct the
jury "that a real estate broker is
not entitled to his commission, as
a matter of law, until the trade is
completed and the papers passed;
that the mere signing an agree-
ment to exchange property, which
is never carried out, does not en-
title a broker, who introduces the
parties, to his commission," and
the judge stated that this might be
true as a general rule, but refused
to give such instruction. He in-
structed them, however, that "it
was no matter in this case whether
the agreement was complied with
by the purchaser or not; that, if
the contract between them was as
the plaintiff had testified to, that
is, if he was simply to introduce to
the defendant a purchaser with
whom the defendant was to make
the trade, and he did so introduce
him, and an agreement was made
between them which bound the
purchaser, the plaintiff's work was
performed, and he was entitled to
his commission." The jury fout
for the.plaintiff, and in affirming
their verdict Justice AwES said.
"In the defendant's * * prayer
for instructions, the general rule as.
to a broker's right to charge com-
missions may have been correctly
stated, but the plaintiff's claim'
rests upon an alleged special con-
tract upon the subject of his com-
pensation, and the jury were cor-
rectly instructed that, if such con-
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tract were proved, he-was entitled
to the commission as agreed."
The recent case of &ribner v.
Hazeltine, (1890), 79 Mich. 370,
further illustrates the rule that the
plaintiff suing for commission for
the sale of real estate must show
that "he procured a customer ready.y
and willing to enter into a contract
on the vendor's terms, whether
those which were originally fixed,
or such as defendant [the vendor]
found acceptable,", before he can
recover. So it must be shown that
the purchaser made "a clear,
plain acceptance of [the broker's]
offer at the time," without which
plaintiff cannot "show that he
procured a purchaser," and "the
testimony of [the. purchaser] that
he intended to take" the property
for a -certain figure "if he could
get the whole of it, untrammeled
by any conditions," will not suf-
fice.: Hannan v. Fisher, decided
in the Supreme Court of Michigan,
August I, 1890.
The same is the doctrine in ffMin-
nesota. The agent employed to
find a purchaser is only "entitled
to his commissions when he pro-
cures a purchaser able, willing and
ready to complete the purchase on
the terms stipulated." If, how-
ever, he is not successful in obtain-
ing a consent to a definite proposi-
tion, he cannot recover: Cullen v.
Bell (i89o), 43 Min. 226; Hamlin •
v. Schulte (i886), 34 Id. 534; Arm-
strong v. Wan (1882), 29 Id. 126.
. In the recent case of/ Francis et
al. v. Baker, decided in the Su-
preme Court of Minnesota, Decem-
ber 17, I890, Justice M=EmrLx
said: "Where a person agrees with
a real estate broker to pay him a
commission if he procures a pur-
chaser for his property on specific
termsj the broker, in order to
entitle him to his commission, is
bound to present a purchaser who
is ready, able and willing to buy on
the proposed terms, and the prin-
cipal is not bound to accept a pro-
posed purchaser unless he is able
to perform the. contract on his part
according to the proposed, terms.
But it is for the principal then to
decide whether the person pre-
sefited is acceptable: and if, with-
out any fraud, concealment, or
other improper practice on [the]
part of the broker, the principal
accepts the person presented, either
on the terms previously proposed
or upon modified terins then agreed
upon, and enters into a binding and
enforceable contract with him for
*the purchase.of-Ahe property, the
commission is fully earned. The
party presented is then a purchaser,
within the meaning of the contract
between the principal and the
broker, although the sale is not
completed or executed by payment
of the consideration to the vendor. " I
Here, the Maryland cases: Rich-
ards, E-'r, &'c. v. Jackson (infra,
page 128), and Kimberly v. Hender
son and Lupton (Id.), were relied
upon in defense, but the Court
pointed out that the former case
"might have been decided upon
the ground that the party presented
had never entered into any enforce-
able contract of purchase, the writ-
ten agreensent containing a pro-
vision giving him the option to re-
lease himself of all liability by
paying a sum of money as a for-
feit;" and added: "This was the
ground upon which [the latter]
case was decided." TheCourt fur-
ther held, that there was nothing
in Grosse v. Cooley (189o), 43 Minn.
188, in conflict with the above
views.
.In Timberman et al. v. Craddock
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(1879), 70 Mo. 638, the action was
upon an express contract, whereby
the defendant promised to pay the
plaintiff a certain sum for effecting
an exchange of a stock of goods,
for real property. At the trial, the
Court below, at the plaintiff's in-
stance,- instructed the .jury that if
the evidence showed the plaintiffs
were the agents of, or employed or
engaged by defendant in the man-
ner alleged, and that they negoti-
ated, or were the procuring cause
of negotiations wfaich resulted in
an exchange, and that the defend-
ants agreed to pay the amount to
negotiate, or for having negotiated
said trade or exchange, the plain-
tiffs were entitled to a verdict, even
though-the evidenice showed that
the negotiations resulting in the
sale or exchange were between the
defendant and the purchaser's
agent, or with the purchaser. The
Court below, at the defendant's re-
quest, also instructed the jury that
they must believe that the plaintiffs
negotiated the sale and exchange,
and that the defendant agreed to
pay the sum sued for, and unless
such agreement was satisfactorily
established, the plaintiffs could not
recover. The judgment for the
defendant was reversed, the appel-
late Court saying: "This instruc-
tion is not in harmony with the
decision of this Court in Tyler v:
Parr (X873), 52 Mo. 249, and is
also in conflict with the instruction
given for plaintiff, which properly
declares the law."
In Slinde v. Scharff (1889), 36
Mo. App. 15, the plaintiff was au-
thorized by the defendant to pur-
chase land for him at a certain
sum, and if the land could be pur-
chased fora less sum, the plaintiff's
compensation should be one-half
of the difference between the two
prices. Plaintiff entered into a
contract for the purchase of the
property, which was signed by him-
self as defendant's agent, and by
other parties as the agents of the
vendors. Justice BIGGS delivered
the opinion of the Court, saying:
"The right of real estate agents to
demand and collect commissions
has been a fruitful subject of litiga-
tion in this State during the past
decade, and the general principles
of law governing such cases may
be considered as well settled. Be-
fore a real estate agent can recover
his commissions for thepurchase of
real estate, he must show either a
valid written contract with the
owner of the title, or such a con-
tract with the agent of the owner,
having written authority from the
latter to make the sale, or he must
show that he produced, to the pur-
chaser, the owner, and that the
latter was then ready and willing
to consummate the trade according
to the terms agreed on." The
plaintiff having failed in all these
particulars: failed also to recover.
In Bailey v. Chapiman (1867), 41
MO. 536, the action was for com-
missions, and in giving judgment
therefor the Court said: "A broker
employed to make a sale under an
agreement for a commission is en-
titled to pay when he makes the
sale according to instructions and
in good faith, and the principal
cannot relieve himself from liabil-
ity by a refusal to consummate the
sale, or by a voluntary act of his
own, disabling him from perform-
ance."
The same ruling prevails in New
Jersey: Hinds v. Henry (1873), 36
N. J. Law, 328.
The legal attitude of a broker
employed to buy or sell property,
and his relative rights and duties
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as the basis of his claim for com-
pensation, were thus considered by.
Justice FINCH in Sibbald v. The
, ethdhem Iron Co. (1881), 83 N.
Y-378: "The duty he undertakes,
the obligation he assumes as a con-
dition of his right to demand com-
:missions, is to bring the buyer and
selinr to an agreement. In that all
'the authorities substantially con-
cur, although expressing the idea
with niany differences of phrase
and illustration. The description
and definition of a broker involves
'this view.of his duty. Story says:
'The 'true definition of a broker
seems to be that he is ain agent em-
ployed to make bargains and con-
tracts between other persons in
matters of trade, commerce or
navigation for a compensation
'ommonly called brokerage.' (Story
on Agency, a 28.) In Poll v. Tur-
nert (i83o), 6 Bing. 702, 706, a
broker is more tersely and quite
accurately described as 'one who
makes a bargain for another and
receives a commission for so
"doing."' After citing numerous
cases and the language of the Courts
therein, the Justice sums up the
matter in these words: "But in all
the cases, under all the varying
forms of expression, the funda-
mental and correct doctrine is, that
the duty assumed by the broker is
to bring the minds of the buyer
and seller to an agreement for a
4saleTand the price and terms on
'which it is to be made, and until
that is done his right to commis-
sion does not accrue."
In Wylie v. The Marine Natimal
Bank of he City of New York
(z875), 6z N. Y. 415, where action
was brought by plaintiff to recover
his commission upon an alleged
sale of real estate for the defendant,
the law is thus stated: "There.are
many reported cases of suits by
real estate brokers for their com-
missions, and the opinions of the
learned judges are not always in
harmony with each other. But a
few general rules may be regarded
as settled. One who has employedi
a broker can himself sell the prop-
erty to a ptfrchaser whom he has
procured without any aid from the
broker. Before the broker can be
said to -have eaxned his commis-
sions, he must produce a purchaser
who is ready and willing to enter
into contract- upon his employer's
terms, The broker must, be th4
efficient agent or the procuring
cause of the sale. The means em-!
ployed by him, and his efforts,
must result in the sale. "He- must
find the purchaser, and the sale
must proceed from -his efforts act-
ing as broker, It is not indispen-
sable that the purchaser should be
introduced to the owner by the
broker, nor that the brokershould
be personally acquainted with the
purchaser. But in such cases it
must affirmatively appear that the
purchaser was induced to apply to
the owner through the means em-
ployed by the broker. If he was
the producing cause of the -sale,
his right to compensation -mll not
be affected by the circumstance
that the owner was ignorant of it
at the time he entered into the con-
tract with the purchaser."
" In Frase, Execuriz, &c. v.,
Wykoff (1875), 63 N Y. 445t
where the action was to recover
commission for effecting a sale of a
patent interest owned by the de-
fendant, Justice ALL=i, in affirm-
ing the judgment of the Court be.
low in the defandant's favor, thus
states the law: "A broker for tho
sale of real estate is entitled to his
commissions when, in the language
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of the cases, he ' is the procuring
cause of the sale'; that is, when
he has ffound a purchaser and
brought him to his employer and a
contract is made between them for
the sale of the property, or a pur-
chaser is ready to purchase and the
seller refuses or is unable to con-
summate the sale. He is not, how-
ever, entitled to commissions until
he has performed the undertaking
assumed by him. -Whatever may
be the terms and conditions upon
which .his right to compensation
depends, they must be performed,
as acondition precedent to a right
of action for a commission. A
broker to negotiate the sale of an
estate is not entitled to his com-
mission until he finds a purchaser
ready and willing to complete a
purchase on the terms prescribed
by the seller and assented to by
the broker."
In Sussdorf v. Schmidt el al.
(1873), 55 N. Y. 319, the plaintiff
claimed to recover commission for
the sale of the defendant's real
estate. The Court below gavejudg-
ment in his favor, which was
affirmed on appeal, Chief Justice
CHURCH thus stating the law: "A
person claiming a commission
ippon a sale of real estate must
show an employment, and that the
sale was made by means of his
efforts or agency. An owner may
employ several brokers for the sale
of the same property, and is of
course only liable for commission
to the one who effects the sale.
And although he employs one or
more brokers, he may negotiate
and sell the property himself with-
out liability to anyone for commis-
sions. The undertaking of the
broker is to make efforts to procure
a purchaser, but if he fails, he is
entitled to no pay, unless there is a
special contract. But if the pur-
chaser is found by his efforts and
through his instrumentality, he is
entitled to compensation, although
the owner negotiates the sale him-
self. Nor is it indispensable that
the purchaser should be introduced
to the owner by the broker, nor
that the broker should be person-
ally acquainted with the pur-
chaser; but in such cases it must
affirmatively appear that the pur-
chaser was induced to apply to the
owner through the means employed
by the broker." So in O"ooney v.
Elder (1874), 56 N. Y. 238, also an
action to recover commission for
procuring a purchaser for the de-
fendant's property, in affirming the
judgment in the plaintiff's favor
Justice GioVSR says: "To entitle
the plaintiff to his commission
under the contract, it must appear
either that the property had been
actually sold, either through the
agency of the plaintiff or of some
other, or that from like agency a
purchaser had been found ready
and willing to take the property
upon the terms fixed by the defend-
ant."
In Graves el at. v. Baines et al.,
decided in the Supreme Court of
Texas, June 24, 1890, the plaintiff'
was engaged by the defendant to
sell upon commission; the plain-
tiff went with the purchaser to
view the property, and the latter
agteed to the -terms, provided he
could get the defendant to allow
him an account as part payment.
The purchaser subsequently went
to see the defendant, arranged the
matter with him, and purchased
the property. In affirming the
plaintiff's judgment, Justice CoL-
L RD, after citing numerous au-
thorities, said: "Baines tthe plain
tiff] procured the purchaser,
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began the negotiations, which were
afterwards finally consummated by
the owners and the purchaser. His
services as agent brought about the
sale, and such services were the
efficient cause of it."
-The law as thus stated is sup-
ported-by Chief Justice DIXON in
Stewart v. Mather and another
(1873), 32 Wis. 344: "The authori-
ties * * show that wherever the
sale is effected through the efforts
of the broker, or through informa-
tion derived from him, so that he
may be said to have been the pro-
curing cause of it, his services are
regarded as highly meritorious and
beneficial, and the law leans to that
constinction which will best secure
the payment of his commissions,
rather than the contrary."
In Maryland, a somewhat differ-
ent rule would appear to prevail, in
that the agent must not only find a
purchaser ready and willing to
complete the purchase, but such
person must ultimately become the
purchaser. This was held in Kim-
berley v. Henderson and Lupton
(1868), 29 Md. 512, where the action
was brought to recover commis-
sions for effecting a sale. The con-
tract of sale contained a clause
that if either party failed to comply
therewith, he should forfeit a given
sum to the other. This the pur-
chaser did, and so no sale was
effected. In reversing the plain-
tiff'sjudgmentJustice A&vpy said:
"To be entitled [to their commis-
sions], they should have copleted
the sale-that is, they should have
found a purchaser in a situation,
ready and willing to complete the
purchase according to the terms
agreed on. The undertaking to
procure a purchaser requires of the
party so undertaking, not simply
to name or introduce a person who
may be willing to make any sort of
contract in reference to the prop-
erty, but to produce a party cap-
able, and who ultimately becomes
the purchaser. * * Here the
undertaking failed. A party was
produced, it is true, and a contract
entered into through the agency of
the appellces, but of such a charac-
ter that the party contracting, by
the exercise of an option given
him, relieved himself of the obli-
gation to complete the purchase,
and did not, in fact, become the
purchaser." In Richards, Ex'r,
&c. v.Jackson (1869), 31 Md. 250,
the same ruling is established, the
Court affirming and approving of
the lawas laid down inKimberleyv.
Henderson and Lupton, supra. To
the same effect is the more recent
case of Attrill v. Patterson (1882),
58 Md. 226.
In Livezy v. Miller (1884), 6i
Md. 336, Justice IRVING uses the
following language confirming the
above: "It is well settled by the
authorities generally, and in this
State, that a broker is entitled to
his commissions if the sale effected
can be referred to his instrumen-
tality. It is also the established
rule that, after negotiations, begun
through a broker's intervention,
have virtually culminated in a sale,
the agent cannot be discharged, so
as to deprive him of his commis-
sions. If the agent is the procur-
ing cause of the sale made, he will
be awarded his commissions." In
the more recent case of Blake v.
Slump et al., decided in the Court
of Appeals of Maryland, Novem-
ber r4, I89o , Justice IRVING re-
marked that the "introduction
must have been the procuring
cause of the sale. It is the un-
doubted law that the introduction
must be the foundation of the nego.-
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tiations and procuring cause of the
sale. If it is such foundation and
procuring cause, then the broker is
entitled to commissions, notvith-
standing the sale may have been
finally effected by direct treaty of
the parties without the broker's
intervention."
The still more recent case of
Stevens v. Scott et al. (x89o), 43
Kan. 285, further supports the rule
that when a broker finds a person
able, ready and willing to pur-
chase the property upon the terms
specified. by the owner, and the
latter sells to such party, the
broker is entitled to his commis-
sions.
So strictly has the principle that
the agent's acts must be the causa
causans been applied, that he can-
not recover if his acts are merely
one of a chain, or a mere link in
the chain, which procures the pur-
chaser. He must in every case
prove himself to be the causa
causans. Thus in Ramsey v. West
(1888), 31 Mo. App. 676, where the
plaintiff was employed by the de-
fendant to procure a purchaser,
and found one, with whom the de-
fendant entered into a written con-
tract, stipulating the amount and
mode of payment, and containing
a condition by which if the pur-
chaser failed to make payment or
tender of the first payment on the
day named, the contract was to be-
come void. The purchaser refused
to complete, and counter suits were
instituted, and finally the sale was
carried out substantially as origi-
nally agreed on. On re-hearing,
Justice HALL, in giving judgment
in defendant's favor, said: "There
was no evidence of anything done
by the plaintiff to procure that sale
but the procurement by him of
VoL. XXX-9
that contract. * * The broker
must be the procuring cause of the
contract on which he depends for
his recovery. It will not suffice
for his act to be one of the chains
of causes producing the contract;
it must be the procuring or induc-
ing cause, or as it has been said, it
must be the causa causans. "
It is often a question, notwith-
standing the general rule as above
laid down, in cases where the
broker's agreement has merely
been to procure a purchaser, as to
what act of his will amount to the
finding of a purchaser, or the
effecting of a sale. In Rice and
another v. Mfayo (1871), 107 Mass.
550, where the plaintiffs contended
the agreement was, that if the
plaintiffs would endeavor to sell
the defendant's land for a certain
sum, the defendant -would pay
them a given commission when-
ever the land should be sold;,
whether sold through the aid of
the plaintiffs or not, Justice GRAY
ruled that: "A contract or memo-
randum in writing, binding both
seller and purchaser, was a sale
effected, within the meaning of the
agreement on which the plaintiffs
relied, although a formal deed had
not been executed or delivered."
In Flower v. Davidson et al.,
decided in the Supreme Court of
Minnesota, July Ii, I89O, the con-
tract depended upon the following
letter written by the defendants:
"If a sale is made by you to a cus-
tomer within the time limited in
the option of even date herewith,
and on terms mentioned therein,
the estate of W. F. Davidson will
allow and pay to you, on the com-
pletion of the transfer of said prop-
erty, a commission of Five thou-
sand dollars in cash; but if for any
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reason a sale is not consummated,
there shall be no commission paid,
or any obligation whatever in the
premises. If there should be any
unexpected delay, and a sale should
ultimately be consummated to a
customer whom you have found,
and who has come to us through
your negotiations, and on terms
contained in the option, you shall
nevertheless be paid the Five thou-
sand dollars." In finding for the
defendants, justice MITcHLL de-
clared that: "According to the
contract * * although plaintiff
procured a purchaser who entered
into a contract with defendants for
the purchase of the property on
the proposed terms, yet he would
not be entitled to his commission
until and unless such contract was
' completed' or ' consummated' by
the transfer of the property, and
the payment or securing of the
purchase money in accordance with
the terms upon which plaintiff was
authorized to sell, or which de-
fendants accepted as such."
In cases where there has been a
binding contract of sale entered
into between the vendor and the
-urchaser, and the latter has re-
fused to complete, and the former
has seen fit to release him from his
obligation, the courts have in
some instances held that such facts
did not relieve the vendor from his
liability to pay the broker his com-
mission. Thus in Love et al. v.
Miller et al. (1876), 53 Ind. 294,
'where the appellants, real estate
brokers, and the appellees, owners
of real estate, mutually agreed that
if the appellants would "find a
purchaser, or make a sale of the
said real estate," they should re-
ceive for their commission one
thousand dollars. An offer was
procured and accepted by the ap-
pellees. The purchaser refused to
complete the sale, and the appel-
lants thereupon told the appellees
they should hold them to their
agreement for commission. The
appellees refused to pay it, and the
question then raised was: Are the
appellants entitled to recover their
commission against the appellees
upon the facts stated? Justice
BiDDLn, in giving judgment for
the commission, said: "The case,
we think, turns upon the sole
question whether the offer and ac-
ceptance, as set forth, amounts to
' finding a purchaser or making a
sale' of the real estate described, or
not, within the meaning of the
agreement made between the ap-
pellants and appellees. The ques-
tion involved in this case has never
before been presented in this State,
we believe. Indeed, we have very
few reported cases, in any way
touching the subject matter of
brokers' commissions. The au-
thorities of other States do not
seem to entirely agree; but upon
close analysis, it does not appear
that they are in serious conflict.
To complete a sale of personal
property, either actual or poten-
tial, delivery of the article sold is
necessary, unless there is some dif-
ferent special stipulation in the
agreement." After examining the
authorities cited on behalf of the
appellees in support of their con-
tention, which was, "that no
brokerage is due until the sale is
complete and executed; that is to
say, until the consideration of the
sale has passed to the vendor," the
same learned Judge proceeded:
"This rule is not supported, indeed
we think it is quite overthrown, by
the current of authorities; nor does
it seem to us to be applicable to the
State of Indiana. In this State,
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lands are bought and sold almost as
freely as commodities; they are
often mortgaged or pledged as a
basis of business operations; sales
.are made upon deferred payments,
for the purpose of holding them as
'investments; conveyances are fre-
quently executed in trust, for the
convenience of the parties; large
-quantities of land are held by ex-
.ecutive contracts, to facilitate trans-
fers by assignments, in many of
which cases the consideration is
not paid, and not to be paid, and
the title conveyed in fee, for
months, and even years, after the
-sale is made, possession given and
full enjoyment had. Under such
.4-ircumstances, to adopt a rule
-which would deny the broker his
-commission until the consideration
-was paid and the final conveyance
-executed, would be manifestly un-
suitable to our condition, and we
-think unjust. We are of opinion
that when the broker has effected a
'bargain and sale, by a contract
-which is mutually obligatory on
-the vendor and vendee, he is en-
-titled to his commission, whether
his employer chooses to comply
with or enforce the contract or not."
In conclusion, referring to the case
of Lanev. Albright, sup ra, he said:
"We can see no distinction be-
tween the cases in principle, as to
the rights of the agent or the
.brokers."
In the Kentucky case of Cole-
man's Ex'r v. Meade, &c. (1877),
13 Bush. (Ky.) 358, Coleman em-
ployed the defendants to procure a
-purchaser for his property for a
certain commission. They negoti-
.ated with a party, but, being un-
,able to arrange, a personal inter-
view of all parties was had, again
without result. Coleman then gave
.defendants a written proposition of
the terms of sale; they procured
the same person to accept it in
writing, and returned it to Cole-
man. The purchaser found some
defects in the title, which were
cured; afterwards he found the
property a trifle less in quantity,
and refused to complete his con-
tract, and Coleman declined to take
action to compel specific perform-
ance. Suit was then brought by
the appellees for commission, and
judgment rendered in their favor.
In affirming it, the Court said:
"Meriwether [the purchaser] was
bound by the executory contract,
and Coleman might have enforced
it if he had desired to do so. All
the brokers had to do was to fur-
nish an eligible purchaser, that is,
a person ready and willing to enter
into a contract to buy the property.
It was then for the principal to de-
cide whether the person presented
was acceptable. If he accepted
him, he became a purchaser within
the meaning of the contract, and
the duties of the brokers were at
an end, and their commission was
earned as soon as an enforceable
contract was executed." After.
commenting upon, and distinguish-
ing the case from MCGavock v.
Woodlief (1858), 20 How. (6i U.S.)
221, the Court stated the law as
follows: "The true doctrine we
take to be this: The broker under-
takes to furnish a purchaser, and
is bound to act in good faith in
presenting a person as such, and
when one is presented, the em-
ployer is not bound to accept him
or to pay the commission, unless
he is ready and able to perform the
contract on his part according to
the terms proposed; but if the
principal accepts him, either upon
the terms previously proposed or
upon modified terms, then agreed
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upon, and a valid contract is
entered into between the principal
and the person presented by the
broker, the commission is earned.
But if, as was the case in MfcGavock
v. Woodlief, the principal rejects
the purchaser and the broker
claims his commission, he must
show not only that the person fur-
nished was willing to accept the
offer precisely as made, but, in ad-
dition, that he was an eligible pur-
chaser, and such as the principal
was bound, as between himself and
the broker, to accept."
Leele v. Norton (1875), 43 Conn.
219, was a case wherein the defend-
ant had placed in the hands of the
plaintiff a piece of reaf estate for
sale or exchange. Shortly after-
wards a third person placed other
property in the plaintiff's hands
for a like purpose. Plaintiff nego-
tiated between them for an ex-
change, the agreement, which con-
tained a clause to the effect that if
either of the parties refused to per-
form the contract, he should pay
the other party a certain sum, being
reduced into writing and duly exe-
cuted. The third person failed to
perform his part of the contract,
and for this reason, and without
the defendant's fault, the exchange
fell through. The plaintiff claimed
his commission, for which the
Court gave him judgment, saying
per Justice FOSTeR: "Had this
contract been consummated * *
it cannot be doubted that the plain-
tiff would have been entitled to the
commissions now demanded. And
for the conclusive reason that he
would have done just that, and all
that, which the defendant employed
him to do; just that and all that
he undertook to do. The defend-
ant would have obtained a prop-
erty more valuable, in his estima-
tion, than the one with which he
had parted; so much more valu-
able that he preferred paying the
plaintiff the compensation de-
manded for negotiating the con-
tract which enabled him to obtain
it. * * Now though the plaintiff
has not effected a sale or an ex-
change of the defendant's property,
yet he has negotiated a contract
for such exchange, agreed to by the
defendant, in which contract a sum
of money is specified which the
defendant agrees to accept; and in
consideration of which to relieve
[the third party] from his obliga-
tion to make the exchange of prop-
erties. Having thus fixed on the
sum * * as an equivalent for
the performance of this contract
to exchange his property, as be-
tween himself and his co-con-
tractor, the defendant cannot be
allowed to deny that that sum of
money is an equivalent, as between
himself and the plaintiff, by whose
aid he made the contract. * *
The plaintiff then, having ren-
dered services for the defendant,
which he agrees are an equivalent
to procuring an exchange of his
property, is fairly entitled to the
same compensation as he would
have been entitled to had the ex-
change been effected."
In the case of Love et al. v. Owens
et al. (1888), 31 Mo. App. Soi, the
appellants, the defendants below,
contended that notwithstanding
the agent may procure a purchaser,
ready and willing to enter into a
contract to take the property on
the terms proposed, or such as is
agreeable to the seller, and the
agent bring the seller and pur-
chaser together, who then enter
into a written contract, executed
by them, as in this case, yet if the
purchaser afterwards fail to per-
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form the contract without any fault
on the part of the seller, then the
agent is not entitled to his commis-
sion, although the purchaser be
perfectly solvent and able to per-
form. The Court, after reviewing
the previous cases, affirmed the
plaintiffs' judgment, saying: "The
prevalent rule is, that where the
broker, pursuant to his employ-
ment, produces a purchaser who is
willing and ready to take the prop-
erty onthe terms acceptable to the
seller, and the seller enters into a
written contract with him express-
ing the terms of the sale, and the
seller is solvent and able to per-
form, the broker then becomes
entitled to his commission, al-
though the vendee afterwards re-
fuses to perform, without any fault
on the part of the vendor. * *
And the language of our Courts
has been that whenever the agent
procures a purchaser ready, willing
and able, and he is accepted by the
vendor, the agent is entitled to his
reward. * * To permit the seller
to escape his liability to the agent,
merely because he is willing to let
the purchaser go rather than bring
a suit on the valid contract, would
be to encourage injustice and open
up the way for the purchaser and
vendor to get off, merely by the
one failing to comply voluntarily
with his written compact, and the
other to enforce it, the one forfeit-
ing merely his first payment, and
the other pocketing it, leaving the
agent without redress for the wrong
done him."
In Willes v. Smith, decided in
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin,
May 20, 1890, the plaintiff had
procured a purchaser under a valid
contract, to which the vendor, had
he so chosen, could have held the
purchaser; but he saw fit to release
the purchaser, who was unwilling
to complete the contract. It also
appeared that the vendor retained
a sum that had been agreed upon
as liquidated damages for a breach
on the vendee's part. The Court
below gave judgment for the de-
fendant, on the ground that the
purchase was never completed, and
Chief Justice COLE, in reversing
such judgment, remarked: "The
defendant saw fit to waive perform-
ance, and retain the property and
the two hundred dollars which had
been agreed upon as the amount of
liquidated damages for a breach on
the part of the vendees. It appears,
therefore, that the plaintiff pro-
cured persons willing and able to
purchase the property on the terms
fixed by the defendant, and conse-
quently earned his commissions;
for the rule of law is well settled in
this State that a broker employed
to make a sale of property at a
price stated or fixed by the owner,
is entitled to his commissions when
he produces a party who makes the
purchase. And it is, in general,
enough, in such a case, that the
broker produce a party ready to
make the purchase at a satisfactory
price; and the principal cannot re-
lieve himself from liability by
capricious refusal to consummate
the sale, or by a voluntary act of
his own, disabling him from per-
formance. * * It is no answer
to say the purchaser refused to
carry out the contract."
In Lawrence et at. v. Atwood
(1878), I Il. App. 217, the action
was to recover commissions due
from the defendant for services
rendered by the plaintiffs as
brokers, in finding a purchaser for
the defendant's farm. The defend-
ant gave the plaintiffs the price
and terms of sale, and a promise to
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pay a commission if a purchaser
was found by them. The plaintiffs
tried to effect a sale, and in the
course of such efforts brought the
matter before another firm of
brokers, one of whom called on the
defendant with a view to purchase,
but nothing was done, owing to a
misunderstanding. Shortly after-
wards a sale was arranged by the
other brokers upon modified terms
of payment. The purchaser failed
to carry out the terms of the deed
of conveyance, and re-conveyed to
the defendant. The plaintiffs
claimed two-thirds of the commis-
sion. In delivering judgment for
-the plaintiffs, Justice PLEASANTS
said: "There is no dispute about
the facts; the only question being
whether they constitute perform-
ance by the plaintiffs of their con-
tract to find a purchaser. As a
means to that end they employed
another broker, and he procured
and introduced as such a party who
was so accepted by the defendant
and consummated the purchase,
but upon terms differing in some
particulars from those first offered.
* * The change was not substan-
tial. It was not effected by any
agency or neglect of the plaintiffs,
but by negotiations to which the
defendant was an immediate and
principal party, and was by him
freely consented to. Such a change
so effected should not, in our opin-
ion, be held to defeat the claim of
the broker for his commission.
Nor should the failure/of the pur-
chaser to pay * * and the con-
sequent cancellation of the pur-
chase, by agreement of the parties
to it, have that effect. He was none
the less a purchaser within the
meaning of the contract with the
plaintiffs. His purchase was in no
degree contingent or provisional.
An absolute deed was executed to
him, which conveyed the entire
title, and for so much of the con-
sideration originally required as he
did not pay in money lie made and
executed and delivered to the de-
fendant enforceable contracts and
securities of the character origi-
nally contemplated and to his ac-
ceptance and satisfaction at the
time. * * They [the plaintiffs]
were not guarantors of his [the
purchaser's] ability to make any
deferred payment, nor could their
right to commissions be affected by
the want of it, since he was ac-
cepted by the defendant, complied
with all the terms required to con-
summate the purchase, and did en-
tirely consummate it. This ques-
tion of ability, 'as affecting the
broker's right in a case free from
fraud, can only arise when the pro-
posed purchaser is rejected, not-
withstanding his offer and readiness
to comply with such terms and
thus to consummate the purchase.
* * He [the defendant] consented
at the instance of the purchaser to
some modification of the terms he
had submitted * * and fully
completed the sale accordingly.
Thereupon the broker became en-
titled to his commissions, unless
his right was postponed by special
agreement. * * It is clear that
commissions were to be due when
a purchaser should be found, which
would certainly be when the pur-
chase should be made."
In McGavock v. Woodlief (i8s8),
20 How. (6r U. S.) 69, referred to
and distinguished by the Court in
Coleman's Ex'r v. Meade, &c.,
sufira, page 131, the terms of the
sale as given to the broker, were
simple and specific, and were
agreed to by the purchaser, but he
subsequently sought a substantial
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change. The vendor refused to
entertain the proposal. The Su-
preme Court of the United States
therefore found against the broker,
and declared the rule to be that:
"Certainty in the offer to fulfill is
as important to the vendor as in
the terms of the sale to the vendee,
and equally necessary before the
vendor can be put in fault. The
broker must complete the sale;
that is, he must find a purchaser in
a situation and ready and willing
to complete the purchase on the
terms agreed on, before he is en-
titled to his commissions. Then he
will be entitled to them; though
the vendor refuse to go on and per-
fect the sale."
The question has often been
raised, whether the mere introduc-
tion of the parties to each other by
the broker, leaving the terms of
the sale to be determined between
them, is a sufficient act on his part.
The point has also been unsuccess-
fully taken that where the pur-
chaser was introduced by the broker
in the first instance, but the negoti-
ations fell through, and the vendor
-subsequently sold to the same party,
that the broker is not entitled to
his commission. Thus in Scott v.
Patterson et al., decided in the Su-
preme Court of Arkansas, March
15, 189o, the defendant was intro-
duced by the plaintiffs to the pro-
spective purchaser, and negoti-
ations were pending for some little
time without any agreement. The
parties afterwards met at the plain-
tiff's office, but the negotiations
again failed, and the defendant
then told the purchaser that the
matter was off. Subsequently, after
an attempted sale by defendant
himself, he sold the property to
the first purchaser and went with
her to the plaintiffs' office for the
preparation of the deed. The de-
fendant refused to pay a commis-
sion.. In delivering the opinion of
the Court awarding the plaintiffs
their commission, Justice HuGcns
cited the language of the Court in
Tyler v. Parr (1873), 52 Mo. 249:
"The law is well established that,
in a suit by a real-estate agent for
the amount of his commission, it
is immaterial that the owner sold
-the property, and concluded the,
bargain. If, after the property is
placed in the agent's hands, the
sale is brought about or procured
by his advertisements or exertions,
he will be entitled to his commis-
sions; or if the agent introduces
the purchaser, or discloses his
name, to the seller, and, through
such introduction or disclosure,
negotiations are begun, and the
sale of the property is effected, the
agent is entitled to his commis-
sions, though the sale may be made
by the owner."
In Waterman v. Bollinghouse
(i89o), 82 Cal. 659, the action was
brought to recover commissions for
an alleged sale of land. In hold-
ing that the plaintiff could not re-
cover, Justice THORNTON said:
"He never produced a purchaser
ready and willing to buy on the
terms of his employer, the defend-
ant. He cannot therefore recover.
Here the plaintiff had the exclu-
sive right to sell for a term * *
and the defendant, during this
period, himself effected a sale.
Though the plaintiff had the right
to sell, to the exclusion of his em-
ployer, still he cannot recover his
commissions unless he has pro-
duced a purchaser ready and will-
ing to buy as above stated."
In Gillen v. Wise et al. (1888),
14 Daly (N. Y.) 480, the suit was
brought by the plaintiff as assignee
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of one Anthony to recover com-
mission for procuring an exchange
of property, and in affirming the
plaintiff's judgment the Court said:
"There is no question of law in
this case that has not been repeat-
edly passed upon. Anthony is em-
ployed by defendants to procure
city property in exchange for
theirs; he refers them to certain
houses and lots, and they promise
him that if they exchange for them,
they will pay him $5oo agreed upon
for his compensation; he tells
them the name of the owner and
of the agent of the houses, and
they conduct their negotiations for
the exchange through the latter,
ignoring Anthony. These are the
facts established by the verdict, and
there can be no disturbance of that
verdict in plaintiff's favor upon
these facts." The case ef Jones v.
Berry (1889), 37 Mo. App. 125,
further shows that, "It is well
settled in this State, that if prop-
erty is placed in the hands of a
real estate agent for sale, and a sale
is brought about through the exer-
tions of the agent, the latter is en-
titled to his commissions, even
though the negotiations are con-
ducted and the sale concluded by
the owner of the land and the pur-
chaser." In this case the sale was
negotiated and concluded by the
defendants, who claimed that they
had rescinded their relationship
with the plaintiff; but inasmuch
as they had not given notice of
their intention, they were not
allowed to avoid payment of the
commission. To the same effect,
Millan & Abbott v. Porter (1888),
31 Mo. App. 563.
In McConaughy v. Mahannah
(1888), 28 Ill. App. 169, there was
an agreement between the parties
that the plaintiff should advertise
a farm for sale in two papers, the
plaintiff paying one advertisement
and the defendant the other. The
plaintiff was to have a certain com-
mission on the sale, and was
authorized to sell at a certain price
per acre. After the property was
advertised by the plaintiff as ar-
ranged, a party called upon him
and offered a less price per acre.
Of this offer the plaintiff informed
the defendant, who immediately
went to the plaintiff's office and
held a personal interview with the
intending purchaser. Nothinghow-
ever was arranged at this inter-
view, but a few days later the same
party called on the defendant and
completed the purchase at a higher
figure, though less than the amount
at which plaintiff was originally
instructed to sell. In giving judg-
ment for the plaintiff's commis-
sion, Justice UPTON stated the law
as follows: "The general rule of
law applicable to this class of cases
as we understand it, briefly is:
That if the land, while in the
hands of the broker or agent for
sale, is sold by the principal, still
if the purchaser is procured or ob-
tained by the efforts of the agent
or broker, such agent is entitled to
his commission. The commissions
of a broker for the sale of real
estate are due when he has found a
purchaser who buys the property,
and his right to such commissions
is not affected by any modification
of the terms of payment or modes
of security, or ultimate compli-
ance with the conditions of such
sale made between the buyer and
seller, different from, the terms
first given by the seller to the
broker."
In Singleton v. O'Blenis et al.,
decided in the Supreme Court of
Indiana, September 23, 189o, the
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plaintiff was the defendant's agent
to sell land, for a period of six
months, unless a sale took place
earlier, and the defendant reserved
a right to sell himself, paying the
plaintiff the same fee as though he
had effected the sale. The defend-
ant effected a sale himself within
seventeen days, and refused to pay
the plaintiff his fee. Chief Justice
BERxSHn=, in affirming the plain-
tiff's judgment, said: "The appel-
lant reserved the right unto him-
self of making a sale, but in case a
sale should be made by him,
O'Blenis was to be paid his fee the
same as if he had found the pur-
chaser. * * The contract rested
upon a sufficient consideration, and
the appellant having made the sale
in such a short time after its exe-
cution, we think it disclosed suffi-
ciently such a performance of the
conditions upon which the compen-
sation of the agent depended as to
entitle him thereto. What our con-
clusion might be, had the sale
which the appellant made, not
taken place until near the end of
the time given to O'Blenis in which
to make a sale, is a question that
we are not called upon to deeide."
The case of Lockwood v. Rose et
al., also decided in the Supreme
Court of Indiana, November 12,
i89o, although turning upon the
construction of the broker's con-
tract, supports the above principles.
In Plant et u=. v. Thompison et
al., decided in the Supreme Court
of Kansas, December 7, 189o, prop-
erty was placed in the plaintiffs'
hands for sale, who offered it to a
party, but nothing definite was
then done. Subsequently the de-
fendant's wife called upon plain-
tif and stated that they would
like to sell, and would have to
place the property in other brokers'
hands as well, and that the defend-
ants would also try to sell it them-
selves. The plaintiffs made no ob-
jection, except that if the property
should be purchased by the party
to whom they had offered it, they
should -claim their commission.
The defendants afterwards sold to
this party, and the plaintiffs
claimed their commission. In af-
firming the plaintiffs' judgment,
HorT, C., followed the ruling in
Lloyd v. Matthews (1872), 51 N. Y.
124; Carter v. Webster (1875), 79
Ill. 435; Sussdorf v. Schmidt (1873),
55 N. Y. 31, and remarked. "The
claim of the plaintiffs for commis-
sion is not affected because the de-
fendants saw fit to sell the same
land for a price less than they gave
it to plaintiffs to sell. * * The
defendants will not be allowed to
take advantage of their introduc-
tion to the purchaser by the plain-
tiffs, and reap the benefits of the
sale made to him in consequence,
and then escape all liability of pay-
ing them their commission because
they sold the land for a sum less
than the price given their agents,
where the reduction was made of
their own accord."
In Goward and another v. Waters
(1868), 98 Mass. 598, the action was
brought upon a writing by the de-
fendant, whereby he agreed, in
consideration of the plaintiffs pur-
chasing or ]rocuring a purchaser
for certain land of the defendant's
at a given price, to pay the plain-
tiffs all moneys exceeding the sum
named, and also that if defendant
should himself sell the premises,
to pay the plaintiffs three per cent.
of the price paid him. The plain-
tiffs tried to procure a purchaser,
but before they succeeded, the de-
fendant sold the premises. The
Court.below having held that the
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plaintiffs could only recover on a
quantum ineruit, on appeal Justice
WLLS said: "At the time the con-
tract was signed it was mere nudum
pactum. The plaintiffs paid noth-
ing, incurred no expense or loss,
and entered into no obligation on
their part. They were at liberty to
act or not as they pleased ; and
would incur no liability by failing
to do anything. But it is also ap-
parent that the writing contem-
plated services to be rendered and
expenses to be incurred by the
plaintiffs for the defendant; and
that the promises were made in
view of such future services and
expenses. The writing is merely a
stipulation, by the defendant, of
the terms upon which compensa-
tion shall be made by him. Subse-
quent performance of services and
expenditure of money, in prosecu-
tion of the employment thus au-
thorized, furnish a sufficient con-
sideration for the promises of the
defendant. The case finds such a
consideration in fact. After the
plaintiffs had entered upon this em-
ployment, the defendant could not
sell without making the stipulated
compensation. If they failed to
purchase or find a purchaser within
a reasonable time after being called
upon to fulfil, he might terminate
the agreement. But this has not
been done. The plaintiffs are
therefore entitled to the price
agreed for upon the event of a sale
by the defendant himself."
In Arrington and .Farrar v.
Cary (1875), 5 Baxter (Tenn.) 6o9,
the plaintiffs were employed by the
defendant to sell a house for a
given sum. The plaintiffs adver-
tised, and showed the property to a
caller, but nothing definite was
settled. These facts were commu-
nicated to the defendant, who saw
the party himself and concluded
the sale. The plaintiffs sued for
their commission, and in affirming
judgment in their favor, Justice
MCFARLAND stated that: "When
a broker is employed to sell real
estate, and produces a person who
ultimately becomes a purchaser, he
is entitled to his commissions,
although the trade may be effected
by the owner. When the owner
employs the agent to sell, or to
assist him in the sale, if he be un-
willing to pay the usual and cus-
tomary commissions, he should
make a special contract with him,
otherwise the agent will be en-
titled to such reasonable commis-
sions as, for similar services, real
estate agents in that particular
locality are by usage and custom
entitled."
In Mionroe v. Snow et al. (i89o),
131 Ill. 126, the contract was signed
on the defendant's behalf, by the
plaintiffs, as "His authorized
agents," and the defendant ob-
jected that the plaintiffs had no
written authority to make the sale.
It appeared, however, that the de-
fendant had given the plaintiffs
verbal authority to sell, for a certain
price, and if they could do no
better, to accept a less sum, which
was namcd, and afterwards reduced
to the amount for which a sale was
effected, but repudiated by the de-
fendant. The Court below in-
structed the jury that, if they be-
lieved the defendant requested or
authorized the plaintiffs to sell, or
find a purchaser for the property at
the price; and that the authority
was not limited nor revoked, and
that a purchaser was found, willing
and able to buy; and that the de-
fendant, on being notified thereof,
refused to carry out the purchase,
the plaintiffs had earned their com-
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mission. On appeal from the judg-
ment for the plaintiffs, it was ob-
.jected, that the instruction author-
ized the plaintiffs to recover with-
out showing that an enforceable
sale had been made, or that the
contract was completed by a con-
veyance. Chief Justice SHOPZ,
however, affirmed the judgment,
saying: "Appellant contends that,
inasmuch as he refused to ratify
the contract of sale, and the pur-
chaser could not have it specifically
performed, for want of written au-
thority to the plaintiffs to make the
sale, he is not bound to pay the
plaintiffs anything for their ser-
vices. We cannot lend our sanc-
tion to this view of the law. A
real-estate broker employed to
make sale of land, who finds a pur-
chaser at the price fixed by the
owner, who is ready, able and will-
ing to take a conveyance and pay.
the purchase price, has earned the
compensation agreed to be paid
him, or, if the compensation is not
fixed by the parties, he will be en-
titled to recover the usual and cus-
tomary reasonable compensation
for the service performed." And
after citing McGavock v. Woodlief
(1858), 2o How. (61 U. S.) 221;
Doty v. Miller (i865), 43 Barb. (N.
Y.) 529, and Bailey v. Chafimait
(1867), 41 Mo. 537, he remarks:
"We are entirely content with the
view expressed in the foregoing
citation of authority, and are of
opinion that there was no error in
giving said instruction."
So it has been held that the
vendor cannot, by any act of his
own, avoid the payment of the
broker's commissions, where the
latter has by his own efforts pro-
cured a purchaser. That the title
is defective cannot affect the
broker's right, so long as he is not
aware of the fact at the time he
procures the purchaser. Even if
the sale is never consummated, he
will still be entitled to his commis-
sions, provided there is no fraud
on the broker's part.
This question of broker's com-
missions was raised in the Supreme
Court of the United States, in
Kock v. Emmerling (i86o), 22
How. (63 U. S.) 69, on appeal from
ajudgment in the Circuit Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana,
upon the following facts: Emmer-
ling was employed by Kock to sell
a certain plantation, and by written
instructions was authorized to ac-
cept a given sum, payable so much
in cash, and the balance in instal-
ments bearing interest. Emmer-
ling found a purchaser at the price,
who wanted different terms. Kock
consented to the alteration required,
and met the purchaser to complete
the sale. Then, for the first time,
Kock insisted upon different terms,
but the purchaser offered to carry
out the contract as made originally.
Kock refused to comply, capri-
ciously, assigning no valid reasons,
and finally refused to sell. In
affirming the judgment, Justice
MCL AN said: "The terms of the
contract as to the sale were specific
and unmistakable, and everything
was done that could be done by
the purchaser to carry out the con-
tract; but the vendor, without any
reason, refused to complete it. * *
It is not perceived why a contract
to sell property, real or personal,
on commission, should not be gov-
erned by the same rules as other
sales. If a usage has been estab-
lished * * for the sale of plan-
tations, such usage being reason-
able, should govern in the absence
of a special agreement. Nothing.
is more common in our large cities
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than to charge brokerage for pro-
curing the loan of money. This
varies as the money market rises
or falls. One per cent., and some-
times two, is charged for this ser-
vice. The same rule applies to a
sale of property. Where the con-
tract is fair, it is not perceived why
such compensation should not be
paid, as agreed by the parties, or
by an established usage. Where
the vendor is satisfied by the terms,
as made by himself, through the
broker, to the purchaser, and no
solid objection can be stated, in
any form, to the contract, it would
seem to be clear that the commis-
sion of the agent was due, and
ought to be paid. It would be a
novel principle, if the vendor
might capriciously defeat his own
contract with his agent by refusing
to pay him when he had done all
that he was bound to do. The
agent might well undertake to pro-
cure a purchaser; but this being
done, his labor and expense could
not avail him, as he could not
coerce a willingness to pay the
commission which the vendor had
agreed to pay. Such a state of
things could only arise from an ex-
press understanding that the vendor
was to pay nothing, unless he
should choose to make the sale."
In Birmingham Land and Loan
Co. v. Thompson (1888), 86 Ala.
146, Chief Justice STONE, after
citing Coleman's Ex'r v. Meade
(1877), 13 Bush. (Ky.) 358, re-
marked: "The fact that the sale of
the property is never consummated,
does not weaken the force or appli-
cation of the rule, provided the
sale is not prevented by some fault
or misrepresentation on the part of
the broker, or on account of the
inability of the proposed purchaser
to comply with the terms of the
sale. The broker has earned his
commission, when he has found a
purchaser able and willing to pur-
chase at the stipulated price and
terms, and who has been accepted
by the owner of the property,
although the sale is never com-
pleted, if the failure to complete
the proposed sale, is the conse-
quence of an incumbrance upon
the property, a defect in the title,
or of some fault of the owner of
the property to comply with the
terms of the sale. Without some
special stipulation to that effect,
the broker does not warrant the
title to the property; and if there
is a defect therein, on account of
which the sale is never completed,
the broker is without fault, and
should not be made to suffer there-
by. He has fully performed his
part of the transaction, when he
has procured a purchaser, able and
willing to buy. His office has
ceased, and his commission is
earned." Tothe same effect, Sayre
v. Wilson and Ingram (i888), 86
Ala. I51; Henderson v. Vincent
(1887), 84 Ala. 99- .
In Phelpis et al. v. Prusch (189o),
83 Cal. 626, where the authority
was to sell the property at a certain
price, upon certain commissions,
the defendant undertaking to fur-
nish a complete and perfect abstract
of title, a purchaser was procured
willing to take the property, "Title
to prove good or no sale, and de-
posit to bereturned." Theseterms
were agreed to by the defendant,
who delivered the abstract of title,
but subsequently became dissatis-
fied and gave notice of certain ob-
jections in his own title, conse-
quently the purchasers refused to
complete. In affirming the plain-
tiff's judgment, the Court said:
"The contract of the parties was
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not that there should be an actual
transfer of the title, or a valid con-
tract for such transfer. It was
merely that the broker should find
a purchaser who was willing to buy
upon certain terms. This being
the contract on the broker's part,
it was performed when he pro-
duced purchasers who were willing
to buy upon such terms. It makes
no difference whether the defend-
ant had a good title or not. If he
had not a good title, and the trans-
action failed in consequence, that
was not the broker's fault, and is
no reason ivhy he should lose his
commission. If he had a good
title, but took measures to have it
rejected by the purchasers' attorney;
for the purpose of defeating the
sale, it needs no argument or au-
thority to shdw that the broker's
right to a commission is not there-
by defeated." To the same effect,
Blaydes et al. v. Adams (1889), 35
Mo. App. 526; Hannan v. Moran
(r888), 71 Mich. 26x.
Another recent case, decided in
the Supreme Court of Colorado,
November 7, 1890, is Cawker v.
Apple et al., where the plaintiffs
sought to recover for procuring a
purchaser for the defendant's land.
The sale was not consummated, as
the defendant had sold more land
than he was entitled to. The pur-
chaser was willing to take the land
really owned by the defendant, and
pay for it at the same price per
acre, but the defendant refused to
complete the sale unless he would
pay the price mentioned in the con-
tract. Justice HAYT, in affirming
the plaintiffs'judgment, said: "The
consummation of the sale was pre-
vented, however, by appellant's
[defendant's] refusing to deed the
tract, unless he received pay also
for the land owned by the railroad
company. Appellant knew at the
time he placed the land with ap-
pellees [plaintiffs] for sale that the
railroad company owned and occu-
pied a portion thereof. He could
not give the purchaser a title to
the lands so occupied, and was not
entitled to pay therefor. Under
the circumstances, we are satisfied
that his demand is entirely without
foundation, and doubtless made for
the purpose of defeating the sale.
Upon the facts, we think appellees
were entitled to the commissions.
In the case of Finerty et al. v. Fritz
(1879), 5 Colo. 174, it is said. 'But
where an agent has produced a
purchaser who is acceptable to the
owner, and able and willing to pur-
chase on terms satisfactory to, the
owner, he has performed his duty,
and if, from any failure of the
owner, to enter into a binding con-
tract, or to enforce a contract
against the purchaser, the sale is
not completed, the agent may re-
cover his commissions.' "
In Lane v. Al6right (1874), 49
Ind. 275, the action was to recover
a commission upon a contract to
pay the plaintiff a certain sum for
furnishing a purchaser for the de-
fendant's real estate at a given
price ; the plaintiff to let the de-
fendant know thereof soon. The
plaintiff alleged that he sold the
land within twenty days. The
Court below instructed the jury to
find for the plaintiff, unless the
evidence showed that the defend-
ant had sold the land before the
plaintiff did, except it was shown
that there was a contract between
the parties that the defendant was
not to sell the land, or if he did,
that he was to pay the agreed com-
mission. The jury found for the
defendant. It appeared that the
defendant had prevented the sale
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of the land upon the plaintiff's
contract, by selling to another per-
son at a reduced sum. In revers-
ing the judgment, the Court said:
"The appellee [defendant] dis-
abled himself from carrying out
the contract of sale made by appel-
lant. The fact that the appellee
[defendant] had authorized the ap-
pellant [plaintiff] to sell his land,
did not deprive himself of the
power of selling it, but he could
not thereby avoid his liability to
appellant. * * When the per-
formance by one party is prevented
by the act of the other, the party
not in fault should recover in dam-
ages such sum as will fully com-
pensate him for the injury which
he has sustained by reason of the
nonperformance of the contract.
This principle is directly in point
here. The appellant * * acted
in good faith, while * * the ap-
pellee sold * * at a reduced
price to avoid the payment to the
appellant of the sum agreed upon.
The appellee cannot thus avoid the
obligation of his contract. He
made his proposition broad and
comprehensive, and imposed no
conditions. He might have pro-
vided that if he had effected a sale
of the land before the appellant
found a purchaser, he was not to
pay him the sum agreed upon.
Having failed to do so or impose
any other conditions, the courts
cannot make a new contract for
him or impose conditions not im-
posed by himself, but m'ust deter-
mine the rights of the parties under
the contract as made by them."
So in Flower v. Davidson el al.,
decided in the Supreme Court of
Minnesota, July ii, i89o, Justice
MITCHELr, said: "Defendants could
not deprive plaintiff of his com-
mission by a mere willful, arbi-
trary, capricious, or fraudulent re-
fusal to enter into a contract with a
proposed purchaser, or to consum-
mate or perform such a contract
when made: that is, anything
amounting to fraud or-bad faith on
the part of the vendor towards the
agent." He further stated that the
words "for any reason " included
"any cause for the failure of the
contract of sale to be consummated
or carried out not attributable to
the fraud or arbitrary and capricious
act of the defendants, such as the
failure or refusal of the purchaser
to carry out the contract of sale, or
the inability of the defendants to
make good title to the property or
some part of it, or the refusal of
the purchaser to accept the title be-
cause for some reason it proved to
be unmarketable. We apprehend
it is to guard against such contin-
gencies as these that owners who
place their property in the hands
of agents or brokers for sale would
make the payment of commissions
conditional on a sale being actually
carried out by a transfer of the
property and payment of the pur-
chase money. To entitle the plain-
tiff to recover his commission, it
was therefore incumbent on him to
prove that a sale to a purchaser of
his procuring was complete or con-
summated by a transfer of the
property, or that this was defeated
or prevented by the fraudulent or
merely arbitrary and capricious
conduct of the defendants."
In Gauthier et aL. v. West, de-
cided also in the Supreme Court of
Minnesota, January 5, 1891, where
the contract was that no commis-
sion should be paid until the sale
was consummated by the delivery
of the deed, the Court held that in
such a case to be an implied war-
ranty of the owner's ability to con.
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fer a perfect title, and if such title
was defective, and the fact not
known to the broker, he could re-
cover commissions if he procured
a purchaser able, ready and willing
to complete the contract, and ac-
cept a deed at the time fixed for
completion of the purchase.
In the recent case of Greenwood
v. Burton, decided in the Supreme
Court of Nebraska, November 6,
1889, the same principle is fol-
lowed. Burton had been employed
by Greenwood to effect a sale or
exchange of land. He found a
purchaser 'eady, able and willing
to complete the contract, but the
vendor, Greenwood, refused to per-
form his part, and also to pay the
agreed commission to Burton.
Justice MAXWELL, in affirming the
plaintiff's judgment for the com-
mission, said: "It is evident * *
that Burton has performed all the
labor required of him in securing
an exchange of the land in ques-
tion, and that Greenwood, after
having entered into the contract,
refused, without sufficient cause, to
perform the same."
The same rule is laid down in
Hinds v. Henry (1873), 36 N. J.
Law, 328, by Justice DEPUE, in
these words: "The general rule is
that the right of the broker to
commissions is complete, when he
has procured a purchaser able and
willing to conclude a bargain on
the terms on which the broker was
authorized to sell. When such a
purchaser is produced, the princi-
pal cannot defeat the agent's right
to compensation by a refusal, with-
out sufficient reason to fulfill the
agreement which the agent had
power to make." He further says:
"This rule rests upon the general
usage of the business, and is liable
to be modified or superceded by a
special agreement in relation to the
particular transaction, in connec-
tion with which the broker was
employed, or by special agreement
between the parties. Thus, in
London, by the established usage,
a ship broker negotiating the hiring
of vessels, is not entitled to com-
missions until the chartering is
complete, and cannot recover com-
pensation unless the charter party
is signed, even though the negoti-
ation was rendered fruitless by the
fault of the employer." And
again: "The broker may also, by
special agreement with his prin-
cipal, so contract as to make his
compensation dependent on a con-
tingency which his efforts cannot
control, even though it relate to
the acts of his principal. A con-
tract of that character is binding,
and no action can be maintained
until the contingency has arisen."
In Doty v. Miller (1865), 45
Barb. (N. Y.) 529, Justice SUTHER-
LAND said: "A broker or agent
who undertakes to sell property
for another for a certain commis-
sion, if he finds a purchaser willing
to purchase at the price, has
earned and can recover his com-
mission, though the sale never was
completed, if the failure to com-
plete the sale -was in consequence
of a defect of title, and without
any fault of the broker or agent."
Again, in Fraser, Executrix, &c.
v. W yckoff, supra, page 126, Justice
ALLEN said: "If the principal pre-
vent a performance by the broker,
the right of the latter to recover
would depend upon a different
principle, and he might recover
without proving a strict perform-
ance." It did not appear, how-
ever, in the above case, that any
sale was effected, as the defendant
made a different arrangement for
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utilizing his patent, by entering
into partnership with others, and
although the plaintiff was instru-
mental in effecting such co-partner-
ship, yet as his contract was for an
absolute sale, for a certain sum to
be paid the defendant, he could not
recover his commission.
The same is the rule in Pennsyl-
vania, where a sale is not consum-
mated owing to a defective title.
Thus in Sweeney v. Ten Mile Oil
and Gas Co. (1889), 130 Pa. 193,
where a sale had been effected by
the plaintiff for the defendant com-
pany, but was not consummated,
and the plaintiff brought action
for his commission, Justice STER-
R rr, in giving judgment for the
plhLint iff, said: "The plaintiff pro-
cured a purchaser, to whom the
company made a proposition of
sale, and in good faith that propo-
sition was accepted. That there
was a failure to consummate the
sale thus effected, was not the fault
of the plaintiff."
In Keys v.Johnson (1871), 68 Pa.
42, Justice SHARSWOOD thus states
the law: "When, being duly au-
thorized to sell property at private
sale, he has commenced a negoti-
ation with a purchaser, the owner
cannot, while such negotiation is
pending, take it into his own
hands and complete it either at or
below the price first limited, and
then refuse to pay the commis-
sions." To the same effect, Chit-
Ion v. Butler (1851), I B D. Smith
(N: Y.) 5o.
The question of the authority of
the agent to sign the contract has
been raised in defense to an action
for commissions. Thus in Ward
el aL v. Lawrence el aL (1875), 79
Ill. 295, the plaintiffs, real estate
brokers, sought to recover com-
mission under the following con-
tract: " We have this day sold to
Mr. Albert Price fifty-five acres of
land, as follows: [here follows a
description of the property] at four
hundred dollars per acre, payable
&c., &c." This contract was signed
by the defendants and by the pur-
chaser himself. It did not appear
that the agents had any written au-
thority to sign for the vendors.
The sale fell through, owing to a
dispute as to the quantity of the
land, and the defendants re-sold to
another purchaser through another
agent, whose commission they paid.
Justice SHELDON, in delivering the
opinion, said: "Although the con-
tract of sale was not binding upon
Ray and Ward [the defendants],
there being no authority from them
in writing, yet, if they had verbally
authorized the making of the con-
tract, and Price [the purchaser]
was willing to abide to it, the com-
missions would have been earned."
It has also been contended that
where property has been placed in
the hands of several brokers for
sale, to the knowledge of them all,
any one of them assumes the risk
of having his claim -to compensa-
tion defeated by a sale made by
another broker before he procures
a purchaser. This is shown by the
recent case of Brand v. M1ferritl et
al., decided in the Supreme Court
of Colorado, November 7, 1890,
where the property was sold by
another agent prior to the negoti-
ation of the plaintiffs' sale. Ac-
cording to the evidence, however,
in this case, it appeared that the
sale, which the owner contended
defeated the plaintiffs' right to re-
cover, depended solely upon the
purchaser's conclusions concerning
the title ; and that notwithstanding
this fact, he gave the plaintiffs no
notice whatever of the pending
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sale, and permitted them to con-
tinue their efforts in his behalf. In
reply to the defendant's contention,
above stated, BISSELL, C., in affirm-
ing plaintiffs'judgment, said; "It
is wholly unnecessary to determine
the accuracy of this legal proposi-
tion, for the Court has found as a
matter of fact, that no such sale
was made prior to the time the
plaintiffs found a purchaser ready,
able and willing to purchase upon
the specified terms, and notified
the owner." With reference to
the question of notice of the in-
tended sale by the owner himself,
he remarked: "They [plaintiffs]
were * * fully justified in be-
lieving the agency still to exist,
and the owner will be held to the
full responsibility of its continu-
ance, unless he be able to demon-
strate satisfactorily that the sale,
which in law is to be held to termi-
nate it, was in fact consummated
before the brokers found a pur-
chaser and earned the commis-
sion."
A further objection has also been
taken to the agent's right to re-
cover, because the power only au-
thorized him to procure a pur-
chaser, and not to sell the property.
This was the defendant's conten-
tion in Fiske et al. v. Soule, decided
in the Supreme Court of California,
December 31, i8go, where the
plaintiffs were employed by the
defendant to sell certain lands at a
certain price per acre without the
crops, or a certain other sum with
the crops, the commission to be
any sum they could get above those
figures, A purchaser was pro-
cured, without reservation of the
crops, but the Court found that the
sale was for a less price than author-
ized. The purchase money was
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tendered, and a deed presented for
execution containing no reserva-
tion. No objection was made by
the defendant. He afterwards re-
fused to execute the deed and pay
the commission, not on the ground
that the deed was not in proper
form, or on the ground that the
sale was not in accordance with the
authority given by him, but that
the plaintiffs had no authority to
sell, only to procure a purchaser;
that the contract was not within
the power of the plaintiffs, because
it required the defendant to convey
by general warranty against all in-
cumbrances, and that the plaintiffs
were not entitled to recover until
the money was paid. The opinion
was delivered by Justice WORKS,
and in answer to the defendant's
contentions, the Court held that:
"It is wholly immaterial in this
case whether the power of the
plaintiffs was to sell or merely to
procure a purchaser. They com-
plied with their part of the con-
tract. If the defendant did not see
proper to convey to the purchaser
they had procured, this was no
reason why he should not pay their
commissions. It is immaterial
that the plaintiffs in their com-
plaint construed and treated this
as a power to sell, even conceding
that it was not." In reply to the
contention that the plaintiffs were
not entitled to recover until the
purchase money was paid, he re-
marked: "It may be conceded that
this would be so if the purchaser
had failed to pay the purchase
money, but the defendant could
hardly defend on this ground, when -
the purchase money was not paid,
owing solely because he refused to
accept it."
The case of Stewart v. Mikrather
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and another (1873), 32 Wis. 344,
raised a point of considerable im-
portance, and one upon which
there are not many authorities. It
was this: Is an agent employed to
find a purchaser, who purchased
-the property jointly with another
party, entitled to his commission?
In the present case the agent had
introduced the third party as a
-person wishing to buy, but there
was no concealment, the defend-
ants being fully informed of the
facts, and the negotiations resulted
in a sale to the agent (the plain-
tiff) and the third party. In the
opinion of the Court, Chief Justice
DixoN states: IIThe general prin-
ciple will at once be acknowledged,
that a person cannot at the same
time be both agent for the seller to
make the sale, and purchaser of the
-property to be sold. The relations
are wholly incompatible with each
.other, and cannot be combined in
the same person. The law will
not permit it. Assuming the char-
acter of purchaser, the person so
acting necessarily abandons that of
agent, and can claim nothing in
the latter capacity in his negoti-
ations with his former principal.
Such is the undoubted general rule.
But the question presents itself,
whether there may not be excep-
tions growing out of the peculiar
nature of the agency, or. certain
special or limited agencies not fall-
ing within the reason of the rule,
and so not within the rule itself.
The reason of the rule is very plain.
It is, that the interest of the party
as purchaser,' being adverse to that
,of his principal, supposing the
agency still to continue, might, and
most naturally and ordinarily
would, lead to a violation of his
.duty as agent. If a case be pre-
,sented, however, not within the
reason of the rule, as of an agency
limited to a time anterior to the
purchase, or where the agency may
be said to have expired, or the
duties to have been performed, be-
fore the purchase takes place, to
such a case it is presumed the rule
would be held inapplicable. * *
The general rule is, that a person
cannot be agent for both purchaser
and seller, and earn a compensation
from each. The reason of this
rule is the same as that for the
other, which, in general, forbids
the agent or broker from becoming
the purchaser. But to this rule an
exception arises whenever the
reason fails. If the agency or
office of the broker is merely to
procure an interview between his
two constituents or principals, who
themselves negotiate and conclude
the sale or exchange, the broker is
entitled to his customary compen-
sation from each. Not himself
negotiating between or for either
of the parties, nor in any degree
influencing them to make the
trade, it is immaterial that each
was ignorant that he was acting for
the other, and the broker will be
entitled to his commissions from
each." In support of his conten-
tion, he cited lfullen v. Keetzleb
and Lampton (1870), 7 Bush. (Ky.)
253 ; Rupp v. Sampson and another
(I86O), 16 Gray (Mass.) 398, and
Herman v. Afartineau (1853), 1
Wis. 151, and continued: "The
decisions tend very strongly to
sanction the rule, that where the
broker merely engages to find a
purchaser at such price as may be
agreed upon, if he presents him-
self as such purchaser, and the
seller, with full knowledge of that
fact, so receives and enters into
negotiations with him, and a sale
is consummated, the broker may
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recover his commissions. But the
proof in such case should be clear
and the knowledge and intent of
the seller satisfactorily established
in the mind of the jury."
The question was raised in Penn-
sylvania in the case of Tower and
Ward v. O'Neil (1871), 66 Pa. 332,
where the plaintiffs were author-
izec'by the defendant to sell certain
land within a fixed time, upon a
fixed commission. Before the ex-
piration of the time limited for the
sale, the defendant wanted to with-
draw the authority, whereupon one
of the plaintiffs said he would pur-
chase himself. His offer was not
accepted, and the parties after-
wards came to a different arrange-
ment, the authority being deliv-
ered up and a certain compensation
paid the plaintiffs. The question
raised was, whether the offer of
Ward to take the property, which
he and his partner were authorized
to sell, was or was not a sale under
the power. The Court below held
that it was not, public policy deny-
ing the right of an agent to sell to
himself. The plaintiffs contended
that this was erroneous, and that
the rule of law which forbids an
agent to sell 'to himself, or several
joint agents to sell to one of their
number, had no application to the
case. Justice WILLIAMS, in the
opinion, says: "The plaintiffs were
authorized to sell the property * *
and for their services in making
the sale the defendant agreed to
pay them a commission * * and
the additional commission of all
that they might sell the property
for above the sum [named). As
the price which the defendant was
to receive for the property was
fixed and limfted by the stipula-
tions contained in the power of
sale, irrespective of the amount for
which it might be sold, the plain-
tiffs insist that, without any viola-
tion of the policy of the law, either
of them had the right to purchase
the property on the same terms
they were authorized to sell it to a
stranger, and that the 'offer of one
of them to take it on these terms
was equivalent to a sale under the
power, and entitled them to the
commission which the defendant
agreed to allow. But it seems to
us that the question mainly dis-
cussed in the oral and printed
agreement, whether this case comes
within the rule of law, which for-
bids an agent to sell to himself,
does not properly arise under the
evidence. * * It is clear that
the offer, under the circumstances
in which it was made, cannot be
regarded as equivalent to a sale of
the property under the power. It
was not so intended or understood'
by the parties at the time it was
made. There was no tender of the
purchase money, nor was anything
done by the plaintiffs, or either of
them, in pursuance of the offer, to
put them in aposition to treat it as
equivalent to' a sale under the'
power. On the contrary, they vol-
untarily surrendered the power of
sale, and accepted the money ten-
dered by the defendant as a com-
pensation for the services they had
rendered. But if the offer to take
the property was made in execu-
tion of the power of sale, as con-
tended by the plaintiffs, the defend-
ant was under no obligation to
accept it, and his refusal of it did
not render him liable for the com-
missions he agreed to pay for sell-
ing the property. The relation be-
tween the parties, under the power
of sale, was that of principal and
agent, and it could not be changed
into that of vendor and vendee
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without the consent of the defend-
ant. Under no aspect of the case,
therefore, were the plaintiffs en-
titled to recover anything beyond
compensation for the services they
rendered."
The same principles apply to a
broker employed to find or procure
a loan of money, for in Peet v.
Sherwood and another (i89o), 43
Minn. 447, Justice CoLxiNs said:
"The rights and duties of a broker
employed to secure a loan depend
upon the same principles which
govern the broker who undertakes
so find a purchaser of property, and
no substantial distinction can be
made. The inquiries in each case
are, what did the broker undertake
to do? Has he completed his un-
dertaking? And, if not, is the diffi-
culty and failure attributable to his
own act, or that of the party by
whom he was employed? The
loan broker is entitled to his com-
missions when he has procured a
lender who is ready, willing and
able to lend the money upon the
authorized terms. This done, his
duty is performed, and he is enti-
tled to compensation whether the
loan is consummated or not, unless
his right thereto is, by special agree-
ment, made to depend upon con-
ditions which the law does not
annex to his engagement as a
broker. He assumes no greater or
different obligation in respect to
title'in case of a loan than when
employed to make a .sale. The
borrower, when employinga broker
to procure or make a loan for him,
always does so upon the implied
conditions (if there is no express
stipulation in respect to the matter)
that he has the ability and will make
a tender to the lender a title free from
infirmity. It is not the broker's
duty, and no part of his engage-
ment to remove incumbrances, or
to cure defects in title, and, if the
loan is not effected in conveyance
of an incumbered or defective title,
he is entitled to his commissions.
He has performed the contract; the
default is with the other party."
In the recent case, Squires v.
King, decided in the Supreme
Court of Colorado, Septembe 12,
i89o, the defendant instructcd the
plaintiff to procure him a loan, for
which he offered to pay the plaintiff
a commission. The plaintiff found
the money, but the defendant, on
being informed that it was ready for
him, refused to receive it, alleging
as his reasons, a change of mind as
to the rate of interest, a discovery
that he could not invest it as soon
as he had anticipated, and a resolve
on his part that he did not want the
money. The Court, however, found
that there had been a valid contract
entered into between the parties,
that the money had been procured
by the plaintiff, and gave judgment
for the commission.
The learned reader must not,
however, lose sight of the fact that
under the Statutes of some of the
States, California, for instance, the
broker musthave a written contract
with his principal or he cannot
claim any commission. Want of
space forbids an examination of the
Statutes of the States thereon, as
well as of the question of commis-
sions, and of the rights of the
broker, in cases where he pur-
chases the property himself.
[The usual contract between the
broker and his principal is to pro-
cure a purchaser: 26 AMERICAN
LAw REGISTER 545.
The general principles of law to
be gathered from this annotation,
show that the broker must in every
instance comply with the terms of
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the original contract (page 119).
This is exemplified by the Califor-
nia (1i9, 120), Connecticut (120),
Missouri (125) and New York (i19)
cases; and it nlkes no difference
whether the broker's contract be
to procure a purchaser, or to effect
an exchange of property (120).
[So. stated in 26 AMEIMCAN LAw
REGIST R 556.
He must, in every instance where
his contract is to procure a pur-
chaser, prove that he has produced
a person able, ready and willing to
complete the purchase in every re-
spect, according to its terms and
conditions, and that it was through
his efforts, upon his introduction,
that the sale was effected, or in
other words, that he was the cause
causans (121). This doctrine is
established by the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United
States (121), and by the decisions
of the Courts in Alabama (121),
California (136), Colorado (4i),
Illinois (121, 122, 139), Indiana
(131), Iowa (123), Kansas (129),
Kentucky (131), Michigan (124),
Minnesota (124), Missouri (124,
125), Nebraska (I43), New Jersey
(125, I43), New York (126, 127),
Texas (127) and Wisconsin (128).
[Also Doonan v. Izes (1884), 73 Ga.
295, abstracted in 24 AmERICAN
LAw R.GISTER, 341, and leading
article in 26 Id. 547.
The Maryland decisions, which
are considered on page 128, appear
to create a somewhat different rule,
that the purchaser must complete
the sale; that he must be a party
capable, and that he must ultimately
become in fact the purchaser. These
decisions have very recently been
considered by the Minnesota Court
as not very seriously antagonistic
to the general principle above
stated (124).
It is not necessary that the broker
should carry out the negotiations,
where his contract is merely to
produce a purchaser. The mere
fact of his introducing the parties
without further action on his part,
is sufficient, provided the person
so introduced actually contracts for
the purchase of the property.
This is the ruling of the Courts in
Arkansas (135), Pennsylvania (121)
and Tennessee (i39). If the per-
son so introduced enters into a
binding contract with the owner,
his commission is fully earned:
Minnesota (124).
It is absolutely necessary, how-
ever, that the party introduced
must purchase on the broker's in-
troduction, for if such person
merely makes an offer, which is
not accepted, and the owner after-
wards, either alone or through the
instrumentality of another broker,
effects a binding contract with the
same person, the broker having
taken no further steps to bring the
parties together and effect a sale
between them, the broker cannot
recover his commissions (122).
So the broker's acts must not be
one of a chain of causes or events
that ultimately lead to the sale
(129). He must also show that the
purchaser made a clear acceptance
of the offer at the time, or he can-
not be said to have produced a pur-
chaser. He must obtain a consent
to a definite proposition (124). [IEs-
pecially when the owner sells after
changing his terms: 26 AwgRIcAx
LAw REGISTER 56o.
The introduction, however, need
not be a personal one, provided it
be proved that the purchaser was
induced to apply to the owner
through the means employed by
the broker (126, 127).
If he can prove all this, he has
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procured a purchaser, even though
the sale is not completed or exe-
cuted by the payment of the con-
sideration to the vendor (124). The
mere signing of a binding contract
between the parties is a sufficient
finding of a purchaser, although
no formal deed is executed or deliv-
ered (129). But the' contract be-
tween the broker and his principal,
may be so worded as to bar his
right to recover, until the sale is
completed or consummated by the
transfer of the property, and the
payment or securing of the pur-
chase money (129, 130). And if
the broker's right depends upon a
special contract, it must be proved
that he has performed it (123, 131).
The same ruling applies to the
case of a broker engaged to effect
an exchange of property. He must
perform his contract, and show that
an exchange was effected by the
meeting of the minds of the parties
(120, 121, 123).
Where there has been a valid
contract entered into between the
vendor and the purchaser, which
the latter has refused to complete,
and the former has seen fit to re-
lease him from his obligation, the
Courts have in some instances held
that the vendor cannot on this
ground avoid payment of the
broker's commissions (130). This
has been held to be the law in Illi-
nois (133), Indiana (130), Kentucky
(3I), Missouri (132) and Wiscon-
sin (I33); and even in the case of
an exchange in Conneciicut (132).
[Delaplaine v. Turnley (1878), 44
Wis. I, and Lane v. Albright
(1874), 49 Ind. 275, abstracted in i7
AmERICAN LAw REGISTER 670,
and r5 Id. 53.
Where, however, the terms of the
sale as given to the broker, are
simple and specific, and are agreed
to by the purchaser, but subse-
quently are unsuccessfully sought
to be substantially changed by him,
the broker cannot recover, certainty
in the offer to fulfill being as im-
portant to the vendor as in the
terms of the sale to the vendee.
This was decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States (134).
The broker is also entitled to his
commissions, where the purchaser
is in the first instance introduced to
the seller by the broker, but no
contract is effected at the time, if
the vendor gubsequently sells to
such party upon such introduction,
and the broker was the procuring
cause of the sale. This is declared
to be the rule in Arkansas (135), Il-
linois (136), Kansas (137) and Ten-
nessee (138). [The principle may,
be otherwise stated that after the
termination of the contract between
the broker and the owner, no com-
missions are recoverable: 26 A=ER-
IcAN LAW REGISTER 551, 553-
So where the principal has him-
self effected a sale within the time
specified, he has been held liable
for the broker's commissions, in
Colorado (I44), New York (136),
Massachusetts (I37) and Pennsyl-
vania (144). [See also 26 A/Eni-
CAN LAW REGISTER 554, 561.
Neither can the principal by his
own acts, or through a defect in the
title which is unknown to the
broker, defeat the latter's right to
his commissions. This doctrine is
established by the Supreme Court
of the United States (i39), and by
the decisions of the Courts in
Alabama (i4o), California (I40),
Colorado (i4), Minnesota (I42),
Nebraska (143), New Jersey (143),
New York (143) and Pennsylvania
(144). FSee also 26 AMERIcAN
LAwV REGISTER 555, and Barnard
v" Monnot (1866), reported in full
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in 6 AMERICAN LAW REGISTER
209; S. c.; I Abb. Ct. App. Dec. (N.
Y.), III.
So the principal cannot avail
himself of the want of authority on
the part'of the agent to sign the
contract, where there is a verbal
authority, and the purchaser is
ready to abide by it (r44)..
Where the property has been
placed in the hands of several
brokers with full knowledge, they
assume the risk of a sale by any
one of them, but only one of them
is fully justified in believing the
agency to exist, unless the principal
can demonstrate satisfactorily that
a sale was in fact consummated be-
fore the purchaser was found by the
broker (144, 145). And where the
purchase money has been paid, the
principal cannot object to the pay-
ment of the commissions on the
ground that the broker's authority
was only to procure a purchaser,
and not to effect a sale: California
(I45). [Similarly: 26 AMERICAN
LAW REGISTER 563.
The broker has also been held en-
titled to recover where he has made
the purchase jointly with a third
party: Wisconsin (145). Want of
space, however, forbids a full ex-
amination of this phase of the ques-
tion. [See also 26 AMRICAN LAW
REGISTER 565.
The rights and duties of a broker
employed to secure a loan depend
upon the same principles which
govern the broker who undertakes
to find a purchaser. He is entitled
to his commissions when he has
procured a lender who is ready,
able and willing to lend the money
upon the terms authorized, and
having done so, it matters not
whether the loan is consummated
or not, unless there be a special
contract. In such cases the bor-
rower impliedly stipulates that he
has a good title: Minnesota and




[Hamliln v. Schulle (cited in the preceding annotation, page 124) is
also reported in full in AMERICAN LAW REGISTER for February, 1887
(VOL. 26, N. S., page io6), with an annotation discussing the two princi-
ples upon one of which all the suits for commissions are based; namely,
firsl, that the placing of the property with the broker is sufficient, or
second, that there must be a sale actually consummated. The second
view is characterized by the annotator as "obviously illogical and unjust,"
lSecause the broker's undertaking is not to make a complete sale. The
force of this objection has been apparent, and the principle now appears
to be modified to the extent of giving the commissions if the failure of the
sale can be charged against the vendor. The subject had been previously
discussed in a brief note to Lincoln v. AftClatchie (1868), 10 AMERICAN
LAW REGISTER 634; S. C., 36 Conn. 136.
The broker was not allowed to represent both parties, in Orion v. Scofield
(1884), 61 Wis. 382; Bell v. McConnell (1881), 37 Ohio St. 396; Scribner
v. Collar (z879), 40 Mich. 375; Fish v. Leser (1873), 69 Ills. 394; and
Raisin v. Clark (r874), 41 Md. 158. Abstracts of these cases appear in 23
AMERICAN LAW REGISTER 799; 21 Id. 136; I8 Id. 389; 15 Id. 248, 6I.
